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Abstract 
First-order logic is known to have a severely limited expressive power on finite structures. As 
a result, several different extensions have been investigated, including fragments of second- 
order logic, fixpoint logic, and the infinitary logic Uz, in which every formula has only a finite 
number of variables. In this paper, we study generu~ize~ quu~t~~ers in the realm of finite 
structures and combine them with the infinitary logic .3’& to obtain the logics 9:,(Q), where 
Q = {Qi: in If is a family of generalized quantifiers on finite structures. Using the logics 
Y:,(Q), we can express polynomial-time properties that are not definable in LYE,, such as 
“there is an even number of x” and “there exists at least n/2 x” (n is the size of the universe), 
without going to second-order logic. 
We show that equivalence of finite structures relative to U:,(Q) can be characterized in 
terms of certain pebble games that are a variant of the Ehrenfeucht-FmYssk games. We combine 
this game-theoretic haracterization with sophisticated combinatorial tools from Ramsey 
theory, such as van der Waerden’s Theorem and Folkman’s Theorem, in order to investigate 
the scope and limits of generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. We obtain sharp lower 
bounds for expressibility in the logics Y&(Q) and discover an intrinsic difference between 
adding finitely many simple unary generalized quantifiers to Yz, and adding infinitely many. 
In particular, we show that if Q is a finite sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers, then 
the equicardinality, or Hartig, quantifier is not definable in P’s,(Q). We also show that the 
query “does the equivalence relation E have an even number of equivalence classes” is not 
definable in the extension 5?zw(l, Q) of U& by the HSrtig quantifier I and any finite sequence 
Q of simple unary generalized quantifiers. 
1. Intr~~tion and summary of results 
For many decades traditional mathematical logic focused on the study of first-order 
logic on the class of all structures (both finite and infinite) or on fixed infinite 
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structures of mathematical significance. During the late 1950s and the early 1960s 
researchers initiated an investigation of logics that extend first-order logic. The 
motivation for this line of research came mainly from the fact that first-order logic has 
rather limited expressive power on important infinite mathematical structures. 
The work of Mostowski [44] on car&~&y quant+rs, such as there are in$nitely 
many elements, was the starting point of the research on extensions of first-order logic. 
Soon after this, Tarski [4SJ initiated the study of injnitary languages, i.e., extensions of 
first-order logic in which infinitely long expressions are allowed in the syntax. In his 
pioneering papers [39,40], LindstrGm introduced gene~ulized ~~~~ti~ers and ob- 
tained abstract characterizations of first-order logic. The above investigations laid the 
foundation for the systematic study during the 1970s and the 1980s of extended logics 
and for the development of abstract model theory as the area of research whose aim is 
to classify these extended logics and to discover the relations between them (cf. [S]). 
The 1970s and the 1980s were also a period of increasing interaction between logic 
and computer science. While exploring the connections between logic and computer 
science, researchers realized that the finite structures, and not the infinite structures of 
classical ogic, are the ones that are relevant to computer science (cf. [21,22]). Out of 
these considerations, Jinite model theory emerged as an active area of research that has 
been developing steadily over the past 20 years. 
Several individual extensions of first-order logic were investigated in the context of 
finite structures from the perspectives of expressive power and relations to complexity 
classes. Fagin [lS] characterized the class NP of nondeterministic polynomial-time 
problems as the set of properties expressible by existential second-order sentences on 
finite structures. Cl sentences, or existe&zl second-order sentences, are expressions of 
the form 
3s 1*.“3S,cp(Sl,...,S,,Rl,...,R,), 
where S1,...,S,,R1 ,..., R, are relational variables and cp(&, . . . , S,, RI, . . . , R,) is 
a first-order sentence. Fagin’s [ 151 result shows that even the simplest fragment of 
second-order logic is too powerful on finite structures. It also raises the question: what 
has to be added to first-order logic in order to capture exactly all polynomial-time 
properties on finite structures? 
Aho and Ullman [4] pointed out that first-order logic on finite structures has rather 
limited expressive power (cf. also [16-j). Intuitively, these limitations arise from the fact 
that first-order logic on finite structures lacks a recursion mechanism, To remedy this 
situation, Chandra and Ware1 [ll] introduced ~x~~j~~ logic on finite structures, 
which can be described succinctly as first-order logic augmented with least fixpoints of 
positive first-order formulas. Fixpoint logic had been studied earlier by logicians on 
infinite structures under the name inductive dejhzbility and turned out to be a power- 
ful tool for analyzing second-order quantification on infinite structures (cf. [43, 31). 
The expressive power and the structural properties of fxpoint logic were investi- 
gated by several researchers, including [2,48,28,23]. From a computational stand- 
point, every property expressible in fixpoint logic on finite structures is computable in 
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PTIME. On the positive side, fixpoint logic not only can express connectivity, 
acyclicity, and 2-colorability, but it can also capture certain properties that are 
complete for polynomial time, such as the path systems query [12]. On the other hand, 
fixpoint logic is unable to express many properties that directly or indirectly involve 
counting, such as “there is an even number of elements” or “there is an Eulerian cycle” 
(cf. [ 111). 
This deficiency of fixpoint logic can be overcome if the inputs are restricted to be 
ordered finite structures, i.e., if it is assumed that the underlying vocabulary contains 
a binary symbol < which is always interpreted as a total ordering of the universe of 
the input structure. Indeed, Immerman [28] and Vardi [48] showed that on ordered 
finite structures a property is expressible in fixpoint logic if and only if it is computable 
in polynomial time. 
Although the above result identifies the expressive power of fixpoint logic on an 
important class of finite structures, it does not answer the question of what has to be 
added to first-order logic in order to capture polynomial time on finite structures. 
Equivalently, this question can be phrased as: what has to be added to first-order logic 
to capture exactly all order-independent polynomial-time properties of ordered finite 
structures? (a property of ordered structures is order-independent if it does not depend 
on the actual total ordering on the universe of the structure). These questions have 
attracted considerable attention in both complexity theory (cf. [28,22,30]) and 
database theory ([2]), because, although an order is always present when representing 
or encoding finite structures by strings, in practice all algorithmic problems about 
finite structures have to do with order-independent properties. In spite of considerable 
efforts, however, so far there has not been found an extension of first-order logic that 
captures exactly all polynomial-time properties on finite structures. This state of 
affairs has motivated Gurevich [22] to make the bold conjecture that no such logic 
exists. 
To enhance the power of fixpoint logic, Immerman [ZS] augmented it with counting 
quantijiers (3 ix), for each positive integer i. The interpretation of the quantifier (3 ix) is 
that “there are at least i elements x such that . ..“. Fixpoint logic with counting 
quantifiers becomes more powerful than fixpoint logic on two-sorted finite structures 
in which one of the sorts is for the universe of the original structures, while the other is 
used to do arithmetic on the counting quantifiers. In particular, properties such as 
“there is an even number of elements” are easily expressible in that setup. Immerman 
[28] conjectured that fixpoint logic with counting quantifiers can express all poly- 
nomial-time properties. This conjecture, however, was refuted later on by Cai et al. 
c91. 
The limited expressive power of first-order logic can also be increased by permitting 
infinitary rules in the syntax. Note that the well-known infinitary logic _L?‘~,~, which 
allows for countable disjunctions and conjunctions, is too potent on finite structures 
to be of interest, since every class of finite structures is definable in this logic. A better 
alternative is provided by the family L?:,, k 2 1, of infinitary logics that allow infinite 
disjunctions and conjunctions, but have only a total of k distinct variables. These 
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logics were originally introduced by Barwise [7] with infinite structures in mind, but 
turned out to be of interest and use in finite model theory. Indeed, they underlie much 
of the work in [27,29,9,30] and have also been studied in their own right ([35,36]). 
On finite structures the union dp& = up! 1 Y&, of the infinitary logics Z&, is 
a proper extension of fixpoint logic, but it suffers from the same limitations as fixpoint 
logic when it comes to “counting”. Many of these limitations are easily overcome if the 
counting quantifiers (3 ix), i 2 1, are added to 5&,,. For example, the property “there 
is an even number of elements” is expressible by the formula: 
iy ((32ix)(x = X)A--l(32i + 1x)(x = x)). 
r 
Similarly, the property “there is an Eulerian cycle” is expressible in _Y$,(C) by the 
sentence 
(Vx) v (~2~Y)~(~,Y)Al(~2~ + lyMx,y) 
L 1 1 llt1 
The above sentence asserts that every node in a graph G = (V, E) is of even degree, 
which is a condition equivalent o the existence of an Eulerian cycle in G. Notice that 
the agreement that (3 ix) is a new quantifier entails that only one variable, namely x, is 
used in the above formula (in contrast, the first-order translation of each (3ix) 
requires i variables). This is quite important when we are very conscious of the total 
number of variables used in a formula. We let 5?&,(C) denote the logic obtained by 
augmenting P& with all counting quantifiers and we write .P’$,(C) for the union 
up= 1 Z&(C). As it turns out, even the logic U&JC) cannot express all polynomial- 
time properties of graphs. Indeed, this is again a consequence of the main result in Cai 
et al. [9]. 
There is an alternative approach to enhancing the expressive power of _!Z&,, an 
approach which is motivated by the work of Mostowski [44] and Lindstrom [39,40] 
on generalized quantifiers on infinite structures and by the subsequent developments 
in the study of extended logics [8]. Rather than adding all infinitely many counting 
quantifiers at once, we may add individual tailor-made generalized quantifiers that are 
meaningful on finite structures. For example, we need not add all counting quantifiers 
to express “there is an even number of elements”, all we need is the quantifier 
Qevenx4+) * 1(x: q(x)) I is even. 
Similarly, we need but one new quantifier to express “at least half of the elements 
satisfy .. .“, or “the number of elements atisfying .. . divides the size of the universe”. 
These quantifiers are said to be of type (1) or simple wary generalized quantijiers, 
because they apply to only one formula (simple) and they bind only one variable 
(unary), Generalized quantifiers on finite structures were studied explicitly for the first 
time by Hajek [24]. Our goal in this paper is to undertake a systematic study of 
generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. To this effect, we introduce the family of 
infinitary logics 5&,,(Q), k 2 1, where Q = {Qi: iEZ} is a collection (finite or infinite) 
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of simple unary generalized quantifiers on finite structures. These logics are 
obtained by augmenting in a natural way the infinitary logics LZ’kO with the quanti- 
fiers Qi, i E 1. 
We study both the model-theoretic properties and the expressive power of the 
infinitary logics L&(Q), k 2 1, on finite structures. Our first result is that the logics 
U:,(Q), k 3 1, are sufficiently well-behaved to admit a game-theoretic characteriza- 
tion of equivalence in YLo(Q), i.e., we can tell whether or not two finite structures 
satisfy the same sentences of U:,(Q) by using appropriate pebble games. These 
games generalize both the k-pebble games for _Yk,, in [7,27] and the counting 
k-pebble game for L?&,(C) in [9,30]. As the first application of the pebble games for 
S?:,(Q), we obtain a structural characterization of the counting quantifiers by 
showing that the counting quantifiers are essentially the only simple unary general- 
ized quantifiers on finite structures that are monotone and possess a certain useful 
closure property, called relatiuization. 
In terms of expressive power, it is easy to see that the infinitary logic Y:,,(C) with 
the counting quantifiers can subsume every logic Y&(Q) = UT= 1 L&,(Q), where 
Q = {Qi: iel} . IS an arbitrary collection of simple unary generalized quantifiers on 
finite structures. However, if a formula cp of L?&(C) defines a property that is not 
expressible in the infinitary logic Z&,, (such as “there is an even number of elements”), 
then an infinite number of distinct counting quantifiers must occur in cp. Thus, it is 
natural to ask: is there a finite sequence Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) of simple unary quantifiers 
such that P’&,(Q) has the same expressive power as U&,(C)? This question is an 
instance of a more general problem, namely, given two collections Q and Q* of 
generalized quantifiers on finite structures, how do the infinitary logics Y:,(Q) and 
L?E,,,(Q*) compare to each other in terms of expressive power? We use the pebble 
games for the logics L&,JQ), k b 1, to answer such questions. 
Our main technical result is that there are natural polynomial-time properties on 
finite structures that are expressible by sentences of Z;,(C), but are not expressible 
by any sentence of _.F&JQ), where Q is a finite sequence of arbitrary simple unary 
generalized quantifiers and k is a positive integer. In particular, we establish that on 
the class of finite graphs no sentence of _YkJQ) can express the query “do two given 
vertices have the same degree?“. We also show that on the class of finite equivalence 
relations no sentence of Y:,(Q) can express the query “is there an even number of 
equivalence classes?“. The proofs require the construction of structures uch that, on 
the one hand, they satisfy the same sentences of U:,(Q), but, on the other, they 
disagree on these queries. The required structures are constructed by means of 
a method we call the (k,Q)-coloring method combined with sophisticated tools from 
Ramsey Theory, such as van der Waerden’s Theorem and Folkman’s Theorem. Up to 
now constructions for lower-bound results in finite model theory have been either 
direct constructions, as in [16,14,9], or probabilistic constructions, as in [S]. Our 
approach of utilizing combinatorial principles in building structures is entirely differ- 
ent from the previously used techniques and opens the possibility of obtaining novel 
lower-bound results for expressibility in finite model theory. 
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All the individual extensions of first-order logic discussed above have been studied 
on finite structures in their own right, but no general theory of extended logics in finite 
model theory has been developed so far. It is natural to ask whether or not the 
framework of abstract model theory developed by logicians can provide such a gen- 
eral theory. As it turns out, finite model theory does not fall under the scope of the 
current framework of abstract model theory. This is so, because, although the concept 
of an extension of first-order logic in abstract model theory permits great flexibility in 
the syntax and the semantics, the framework is rather rigid when it comes to the part 
of the structures considered. More specifically, it is the case that always both finite and 
infinite structures are considered. In fact, the infinite structures play an indispensable 
role in many theorems of abstract model theory. This is manifested with Lindstrom’s 
[40] theorem, which does not yield a characterization of first-order logic on finite 
structures, because the compactness theorem of first-order logic fails when only finite 
structures are considered. 
In this paper we expand the framework of abstract model theory in a way that 
allows for a treatment of finite model theory. A multitude of lines of research emerges 
in this expanded framework, each with its own technical problems. Are there any 
interesting results in abstract model theory that carry over to finite structures? What 
can be said about the expressive power and the model-theoretic properties of first- 
order logic augmented with generalized quantifiers on finite structures? Is there 
a Lindstrom-type characterization of first-order logic or of fixpoint logic on finite 
structures? The latter question is of particular interest, because such a characteriza- 
tion of fixpoint logic may provide a deeper explanation for its eminence and robust- 
ness on finite structures. 
A few results of abstract model theory still hold for abstract logics on an arbitrary 
class X of structures. This is, for example, the case with the well-known result that if 
the Craig Interpolation Theorem holds for an abstract logic L, then the Beth Dejinabil- 
ity Theorem also holds for L. In general, however, the results of abstract model theory 
do not necessarily carry over to abstract logics on an arbitrary class X of structures. 
This is particularly true when we consider the class 9 of all finite structures. It is 
evident that Lindstrom’s characterizations of first-order logic on the class Y of all 
structures do not hold on %. For an example of a different flavor, consider the 
following: it is known that if Robinson Consistency Theorem holds for an abstract logic 
L on Y, then the Craig Interpolation Theorem holds for L ([42,1.4]). This implica- 
tion, however, does not hold on the class % of finite structures, since Robinson’s 
theorem is trivially true for first-order logic on %, while the Craig Interpolation 
Theorem fails. 
In view of the above, it is natural to ask: is there a theory of abstract logics on classes 
X of structures other than the class Y of all structures? In particular, is there a theory of 
abstract logics on the class % of all finite structures? Are there any model-theoretic 
properties that characterize first-order logic or one of its extensions on %? 
We feel that these are natural questions that merit further investigation. Our aim in 
this paper is to give some evidence that it is indeed both possible and sensible to 
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develop a theory of abstract logics on finite structures. Actually, we believe that 
interesting results in this vein can be discovered by taking advantage of the finiteness 
of the structures and by viewing the absence of infinite structures as a feature, instead 
of an impediment. To illustrate this point, we present a Lindstrom-type characteriza- 
tion of the infinitary logics _Y?‘“,~ and d;pk,,(Q), k b 1, on the class 9 of finite 
structures. 
In order to make this paper as accessible as possible by newcomers to the area of 
generalized quantifiers and abstract model theory, we have included detailed defini- 
tions of the basic concepts and background material from this area. 
2. Generalized quantifiers 
2. I. Background and dejnitions 
Historically, the research on extensions of first-order logic on infinite structures has 
its origins in the work of Mostowski [44] on cardinality quantijiers, such as “there is 
an infinite number of elements”. Later on, Lindstrom [39] introduced generalized 
quantijers and initiated the development of abstract model theory. Since that time, 
researchers in mathematical logic have investigated in depth the model theory of 
first-order logic augmented with specific generalized quantifiers, such as the quantifier 
“there exist uncountably many” (cf. [32]), and have analyzed the expressive power of 
first-order logic with various generalized quantifiers on infinite structures (cf. [8]). In 
contrast, generalized quantifiers on finite structures have gotten much less attention, 
in spite of an early pioneering paper by Hajek [24]. This situation, however, is 
changing rapidly. Indeed, recently the study of generalized quantifiers in the context of 
finite models has found applications in linguistics ([47,31,50,51]) and computer 
science ([9,30,25]). 
One of our main goals in this paper is to initiate a systematic investigation of 
generalized quantifiers on finite structures. To this effect, we are interested in both the 
expressive power and the model-theoretic properties of logics with generalized quanti- 
fiers on finite structures. 
In this section we introduce formally generalized quantifiers and combine them 
with the infinitary logic _Y$, with a finite number of variables. 
We use X to denote an arbitrary class of structures. If ~7 is a vocabulary, we use 
X[a] to denote the class of structures over (r that are in reducts of structures in X. 
Some special cases will be used frequently: Y denotes the class of all structures; 
.F denotes the class of all finite structures. Let < be a fixed binary predicate. We use 
R< to denote the class of finite structures, one of whose relations is < and in which 
< is interpreted as a total ordering of the universe. Structures over the empty 
vocabulary 8 are denoted by (A), where A is the universe of the structure. Thus X[0] 
consists of structures of the form (A). 
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Definition 2.1. A simple wary generalized quantijier is a class Q of structures over the 
vocabulary consisting of a unary relation symbol P such that Q is closed under 
isomorphisms, i.e., ifA = (A, P”) is a structure in Q and B = (B, PB) is a structure that is 
isomorphic to A, then B is also in Q. Let X be a class structures. A simple unary 
generalized quantijer on X is a simple unary generalized quantifier Q such that 
QCBI E xC01. 
Notice that the requirement on a simple unary generalized quantifier to be closed 
under isomorphisms is equivalent o a cardinality condition, namely, a simple unary 
generalized quantifier Q is a class of structures of the form A = (A, X) with X E A and 
such that if A = (A, X) is in Q, B = (I?, Y ) is a structure with Y G B, 1x1 = 1 Y 1, 
and IA - XI = IB - Y 1, then B is also in Q. Moreover, on the class 9 of all 
finite structures this condition amounts to requiring that if A = (A,X) is in Q 
and B = (I?, Y) is a structure with Y E B, IAl = IBI and 1x1 = I Y 1, then B is also 
in Q. 
As mentioned above, simple unary generalized quantifiers on the class Y of all 
structures were introduced by Mostowski [44]. In this framework, the existential 
quantifier on Y is the class of all structures A = (A, X) with X a nonempty subset of A, 
while the universal quantijier consists of all structures of the form A = (A,A). Other 
canonical examples of simple unary generalized quantifiers on 9 are provided by 
cardinality quantifiers, such as the quantifier “there are at least K, elements”. More 
formally, this quantifier is the class Qa of all structures A = (A,X) with X G A and 
I XI 2 K,. If G+? isa class of structures, then the Chang quantifier over X is the class of 
all structures A = (A, X) such that (A) E %‘-[@I and X is a subset of A with IX I = I A 1. 
In all the preceding examples the quantifiers share an important monotonicity prop- 
erty, which now we turn into a definition. 
Definition 2.2. Let Q be a simple unary generalized quantifier. We say that Q is 
a monotone quantifier if for every structure A = (A, X) in Q and every subset Y of 
A such that X E Y, we have that the structure (A, Y) is also in Q. 
The quantifier “there are exactly K, elements” provides a standard example of 
a simple unary generalized quantifiers on 9 that is not monotone. This quantifier is 
the class Q _ of all structures A = (A, X) with X E A and IX I = K,. One advantage of 
monotone quantifiers over nonmonotone ones is that when they are added to a logic 
like Z&,, then formulas, that are positive in a relation symbol S are also monotone in 
S, that is to say, if S has only positive occurrences in a formula, then the formula is 
preserved when new tuples are added in S. 
There are plenty of natural examples of simple unary generalized quantifiers on any 
class of structures. Main emphasis in this paper is, however, on generalized quantifiers 
on the class 9 of all finite structures. 
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2.2. Simple unary generalized quantifiers on finite structures 
We next consider simple unary generalized quantifiers on the class 3 of all finite 
structures. Notice that on finite structures all cardinality quantifiers Qd reduce to the 
trivial empty quantifier, while the Chang quantifier on B coincides with the universal 
quantifier. On finite structures the analog of the cardinality quantifiers are the 
counting quantifiers (Six), i 2 1, consisting of all structures A = (,4,X), where A is 
a finite set and X is a subset of A with at least i elements. The counting quantifiers are, 
of course, expressible using the existential quantifier and first-order logic, but, as 
explained earlier, they become quite interesting when we consider them in the context 
of logics with a fixed number of variables. 
Numerous natural examples of simple unary generalized quantifiers on 9 arise 
from properties that are not first-order definable on finite structures, such as “there is 
an even number of elements”, “there are at least log(n) many elements” (where n is the 
cardinality of the structure), or “the number of elements satisfying .. . divides the 
cardinality of the structure” (the divisibility quantifier). In particular, the quantifier 
“there is an even number of elements” can be viewed as the class 
Q even = {(AX): A . is a finite set, [Xl G A, and 1x1 is even}. 
Notice that the counting quantifiers and the quantifier 
Qhalf = {(A,X): A is a finite set, 1x1 G A, and 1x1 2 IAl/2}. 
are monotone, while the quantifier Q_, and the divisibility quantifier are not. 
A useful insight to the structure of simple unary generalized quantifiers on 9 can be 
obtained by associating with each such quantifier a function that gives the cardinali- 
ties of sets occurring in the quantifier. 
Definition 2.3. Let Q be a simple unary generalized quantifier on the class 9 of all 
finite structures. The dejningfinction fQ ofthe quantijer Q is the function with domain 
the set of all positive integers n and values 
j&n) = (m: 0 6 m ,< n and there is a structure (A, X)EQ such that 1x1 = m}. 
The requirement hat simple unary generalized quantifiers be closed under isomor- 
phisms implies that the defining function of such a quantifier characterizes the 
quantifier, in the sense that for two simple unary generalized quantifiers Q1 and Qz we 
have that 
Q1 = Q2 if and only if fo, = fa,. 
Notice that if Q is a monotone simple unary generalized quantifier on 8, then for each 
n 2 1 the value fo(n) of the defining function is the interval 
[rQ(n),n] = {m: m is a nonnegative integer and r&) < m < n}, 
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where r&r) = min {m: m E f&n)}. In this case, Q is the quantifier “there are at least rQ(n) 
elements”, i.e., it is the class 
Q = ((AX): A is a finite set, X E A, and 1x1 > r&lAl)). 
We conclude that the mapping n H ra(n) is a function from the positive integers to the 
nonnegative integers that describes completely the monotone quantifier Q. Conversely, 
every function r(n) from the positive integers to the nonnegative integers gives rise to 
a monotone quantifier, namely the quantifier “there are at least r(n) elements”. It 
follows that there is a one-to-one and onto correspondence between monotone simple 
unary generalized quantifiers Q on F and arbitrary functions r(n) from the positive 
integers to the nonnegative integers. 
It turns out that, by reflecting on the properties of the function ro(n), we can obtain 
a simple classification of all monotone quantifiers Q on 9. 
Definition 2.4. Let Q be a monotone simple unary generalized quantifier on the class 
9 of all finite structures and for each n 3 1 let rp(n) = min{m: mEf&n)j, where f&r) 
is the defining function of Q. If {m: mef&n)} = 8, then we let rQ(n) = n + 1. 
l We say that Q is an euentualty counting quantifier if there is a positive integer N and 
a nonnegative integer r such that one of the following two statements holds: 
1. rQ(n) = r, for all positive integers n 3 N. 
2. r&n) = n - r, for all positive integers n 2 N. 
l We say that Q is an eventually bounded quantifier if there is a positive integer N, and 
two finite sets S1 = (rI, . . . , q} and S2 = (s,, . . . , s,} of nonnegative integers such 
that the following hold: 
1. S1 u S2 is nonempty and if one of the sets S1 and S2 is empty, then either the other 
set has at least two elements or f(n) = n + 1 for infinitely many n. 
2. For every n 2 N there is a j such that either 1 < j < 1 and ra(n) = rj, or 
1 < j < m and rQ(n) = n - sj, or f(n) = n + 1. 
3. The function ra(n) takes each one of the values rj, 1 6 j < I, and n - sj, 1 < j < s, 
infinitely often. 
l We say that Q is an unbounded quantifier if there is an infinite increasing sequence 
n, < nz < ... < ni < ni+l < ... of positive integers such that 
and 
The counting quantifiers @ix), i B 1, and their dual quantifiers “there are at least 
n - i elements”, i >, 1, are the main examples of eventually counting quantifiers. The 
quantifiers “there are at least log(n) elements “, “there are at least & elements”, and 
“there are at least n/2 elements” are all examples of unbounded quantifiers. Finally, 
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the following are examples of eventually bounded quantifiers: 
. Q = {(AX): (IAl is even and 1x1 > 3) or (IAl is odd and 1x1 2 5)); 
. Q = ((4X): (IAl is even and 1x1 > 3) or (IAl is odd and 1x1 > IAl - 5)); 
l Q = {(A,X): IAl = imod and 1x1 2 IAl - i, i = 0,1,2}. 
The next result yields a classification of all monotone simple unary generalized 
quantifiers on finite structures. The proof follows easily from the definitions. 
Proposition 2.5. Let Q be a monotone simple unary generalized quantijer on the class 
F of all jinite structures. Then exactly one of the following three statements holds: 
1. Q is an eventually counting quantijier; 
2. Q is an eventually bounded quantifier; 
3. Q is an unbounded quantijer. 
The above classification will be used later on in order to establish a structural 
characterization of the eventually counting quantifiers. Moreover, we will show that 
quantifiers definable in _fZ’$, from eventually bounded quantifiers are themselves 
eventually bounded or counting. 
We can think of generalized quantifiers on 9 as queries. Thus a quantifier Q on 
9 corresponds to the query “is a given finite structure in Q?‘. If we think of 
quantifiers on .?F as queries, it is clear what it means for a quantifier to be PTIME 
computable. In any standard coding of finite structures the length of the code of 
a structure is polynomial in the size of the structure. A simple unary generalized 
quantifier Q can be defined to be PTIME if there is an algorithm which decides 
whether a given structure A is in Q or not, and stops in time which is polynomial in the 
code of A. 
2.3. Znjinitary logics with generalized quantijers 
We now define the syntax and the semantics of the logics that are obtained by 
combining simple unary generalized quantifiers with the infinitary logics _Y&,,, k 2 1. 
Definition 2.6. Let Q =’ { Qi: i E Z} be a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers, 
and let k be a positive integer. The injnitary logic Y,&,(Q) with k variables and the 
generalized quantiJiers Q has the following syntax (for any vocabulary a): 
l The variables of _C&,(Q) are vl, . . . , ok; 
l J&,,(Q) contains all first-order formulas over cr with variables among ul, . . . , ok; 
l if q is a formula of 9’:,(Q), then so is 1 cp; 
l if Y is a set of formulas of Z&,,(Q), then VY and AY are also formulas of Z&(Q); 
l if cp is a formula of Z&,,(Q), then each of the expressions 3t+~,Vvj~,Qrrj~ is also 
a formula of Y,,(Q) for every j such that 1 < j < k and for every iel. 
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Notice that although there are only k distinct variables, a sentence of U:,(Q) may 
have infinitely many occurrences of a variable. The concepts of a free and bound 
variable in a formula of P’:,(Q) are defined in the same way as in first-order logic 
with the additional stipulation that the variable uj is bound in the formula Qi~j~. 
A sentence of T:,(Q) is a formula of xl:,(Q) with no free variables. 
The semantics of .Y;fU(Q) is defined by induction on the construction of the 
formulas. More specifically, VYJ is interpreted as a disjunction over all formulas in 
Y and /‘/,Y is interpreted as a conjunction. Finally, if A is a structure having A as its 
universe and qD(uj,y) isa formula of Y:,(Q) with free variables among the variables uj 
and the variables in the sequencey, and d is a sequence of elements from the universe 
of A, then 
if and only if the structure 
is in the quantifier Qi. 
We write 5?:,(Q) to denote the union up= 1 2$,&Q) of the infinitary logics with 
a finite number of variables and the generalized quantifiers Q. If Q is a finite sequence 
(Q 1, . . . , Qn) of simple unary generalized quantifiers, then we write 5?&&?, , . . . , Qn), 
k>i,andS?‘z,(Qr,..., Q,,) in place of ,.5&,,(Q) and Y&(Q), respectively. 
If the definition of the syntax of _YkJQ), k 2 1, is modified by requiring that the 
disjunctions and conjunctions are always applied to finite set of formulas, then we 
obtain the logic _YLJQ), which is the fragment of first-order logic with k variables and 
the generalized quantifiers Q. The union of these logics gives us Yaw(Q), first-order 
logic augmented with the generalized quantifiers Q. 
It should be pointed out that the expressive power of T&(Q) transcends properly 
the expressive power of both YUw(Q) and .Y&,,. This is, for example, the case when 
Q is the family C of all counting quantifiers (3 ix), i 2 1. Moreover, the property “there 
is an even number of articulation points” is easily expressible in Z&,(Q,,,,) on finite 
graphs, although one can prove that it is not expressible neither in Yg,, nor in 
YUo(Qeven). A similar fact holds for the property “there is a connected component hat 
has at least half the nodes” and the quantifier “for at least half the nodes”. 
The model-theoretic properties of the logic Y_(Q) on the class of all structures 
have been investigated in depth for various quantifiers Q arising in mathematical 
practice (cf. [S]). As mentioned earlier, on finite structures the family of the counting 
quantifiers C = ((3ix): i 3 1) and the resulting infinitary logics 5$,(C), k 2 1 have 
been studied systematically by Cai et al. [9] and by Immerman and Lander [30]. So 
far, the infinitary logics Y:,(Q), k 2 1, have not been explored neither on infinite nor 
on finite structures for other unary generalized quantifiers. 
It is simple, but important, fact that on finite structures the infinitary logic Z&(C) 
can subsume every logic Y&(Q), where Q is an arbitrary family of (simple) unary 
generalized quantifiers. A more general result will be proved in Section 2.5. 
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Proposition 2.7. Let Q = {Qi: i E I} be a family of simple unary generalized quantijers 
on a class X ofjnite structures and let k be a positive integer. Zf Ii/b) is a formula of the 
injinitary logic U&,,(Q), then there is aformula ICI*(y) of the infinitary logic U:,(C) with 
counting quantifiers and k variables such that $*(y) is equivalent to II/(y) on all structures 
in x‘. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of 3ko(Q) formulas. The only 
interesting case is when $(y) is of the form Q<xq(x,y) for some quantifier Qi in the 
family Q. By induction hypothesis, assume that cp(x,y) is equivalent to a formula 
cp*(x, y) of U&,(C). Let S be the set of all integers that are cardinalities of structures in 
X and let fat be the defining function of the quantifier Qi. Then rc/(y) is equivalent on 
X to the formula 
(3!nx)(x = x)A 
I) 
of Uk,(C), where 3!nx(...) is an abbreviation for (Inx)(...)r\l(Ein + 1x)(...). 0 
The main result of Cai et al. [9] asserts that there are polynomial-time properties of 
graphs that are not expressible by any formula of the infinitary logic Y&(Q) on finite 
graphs. Combined with Proposition 2.7 yields immediately the following result. 
Corollary 2.8. Let Q = {Qi: i E I} be a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers on 
the class X of allJinite graphs. Then there are polynomial-time properties that are not 
expressible by any formula of the injinitary logic P&,,(Q) on X. 
Corollary 2.8 reveals that there is no hope of capturing all of PTIME by combining 
simple unary generalized quantifiers with the infinitary logic _Yg,. At the same time, it 
raises a number of interesting questions concerning the properties of the infinitary 
logics Y&,(Q) for families Q of simple unary generalized quantifiers. 
Notice that if a formula cp of Y&,(C) defines a property that is not expressible in the 
infinitary logic Yz,, then an infinite number of different counting quantifiers will 
occur in cp. This raises the question: is there a finite family Q of simple unary 
generalized quantifiers uch that Y&(Q) has the same expressive power as U&JC)? 
More generally, given two families Q and Q* of simple unary generalized quantifiers 
on finite structures, we may ask, how do the infinitary logics Y:,(Q) and _Y’,&(Q*) 
compare to each other in terms of expressive power? In the next section we will 
develop tools for studying and answering these questions. 
2.4. Fixpoint logic with monotone quantijers 
The monotonicity condition is an important restriction to the concept of a general- 
ized quantifier. One immediate consequence of this condition is that we can use the 
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concept of a positive occurrence of a predicate symbol to get a profusion of definable 
monotone operators and we can define fixpoint logic with monotone quantifiers. 
More specifically, if Q = { Qi: i E I} is a collection of monotone simple unary generaliz- 
ed quantifiers, we can define jixpoint logic with the quantijiers Q as the extension 
FP(Q) of first-order logic obtained by augmenting the syntax of LZ~,(Q) with least 
fixpoints of positive formulas. Below we shall give a more detailed definition. 
So far, fixpoint logic with monotone quantifiers has been studied mainly on infinite 
structures (cf. [3]). We investigate the expressive power and the closure properties of 
FP(Q) on finite structures. It turns out, for example, that every formula of FP(Q) is 
equivalent to a formula of Y&,,(Q). Moreover, it is easy to see that if the defining 
function fa, of every quantifier Qi in Q is computable in polynomial time, then every 
FP(Q) query is in polynomial time. As far as closure properties are concerned, we 
point out that FP(Q) queries are closed under complements on finite structures. 
Definition 2.9. The dual of a simple unary quantifier Q is the simple unary quantifier 
Q = ((4,X): X c A and (A,A - X)$Q}. 
Note that Q is definable in Z&,(Q) and if Q is monotone, then so is Q. If Q = {Qi: 
i elf is a collection of monotone simple unary generalized quantifiers, then every 
formula in 9&,(Q) can be expressed in an equivalent form which h,as only atomic 
formulas, their negations, connectives A, v and quantifiers 3, V,Qi, Qi, where i E I. 
Definition 2.10. Suppose Q = (Qi: iel} is a collection of monotone simple unary 
generalized quantifiers and cp E Y&(Q). Suppose cp is written so that it conttins only 
atomic formulas, their negations, connectives A, v and quantifiers 3, V,Qi, Qi, where 
iEZ. We say that the occurrence of a predicate symbol in cp is positive if it is 
immediately preceded by an even number of negation symbols. 
The following lemma is easy to prove. 
Lemma 2.11. Suppose S is an n-ary relation symbol not in the vocabulary o and 
4x1, . . . . x,, S) is a formula of YOU(Q) over the vocabulary o v {S} in which S has only 
positive occurrences. Let 
(pO(xl,...,x,) =1x1 =x1, 
(Pi+1(X1,...,X”)=(P(X1,~~~,Xn,~(tl,...,t”)lcpi(tl,~~~,tn)), 
qrn(xl, .. . . x,) = V{$(xi, ,.., x,): i = 0,1,2, . ..}. 
Suppose A is a finite a-structure and 
S={(aI ,..., a,):A,a, ,..., a,kcp”(x, ,..., x.)}. 
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Then S is the smallestjixed point of cp(xI,, . . , x,, S) on A i.e. the smallest n-ary relation 
S on A such that 
(Va,, . . , Va,)(S(a,, . . . , a,) o A, al, . . . , a, k cp(xI, . . . , x,, S)). 
Here cp(xI, . . . , x,, S(t,, . . . , t,)/cp’(tl, . . . , t,)) refers to the formula which is obtained 
from cp(xl, . . . , x,, S(t, , . . . , t,)) by replacing S(t,, . . . , t,) everywhere by qi(tl, . . . , t,) 
for all sequences rI, . . . , t, of terms. 
Definition 2.12. Suppose Q = {Qi: ie I} is a collection of monotone simple unary 
generalized quantifiers. We let FP(Q) be the smallest collection of formulas that 
contains _YUw(Q), least fixpoints cp” of formulas in ZU,JQ), and is closed under 
finitazy disjunctions and conjunctions, existential and universal quantification, and Qi 
and Qi quantification for i E I. 
Immerman [28] considered fixpoint logic with the counting quantifiers Con certain 
two-sorted finite structures, where one of the sorts is used to do arithmetic on the 
counting quantifiers. In the context discussed here, FP(C) has the same expressive 
power as fixpoint logic FP, while FP(Q,,J is strictly more expressive than FP. By 
imitating the usual proof that fixpoint logic on finite structures is contained in _.Y&,, 
([7]) and the proof that fixpoint queries are PTIME, one can show the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2.13. Suppose Q = {Qi: ieZ) is a collection of monotone simple unary 
PTIME generalized quantifiers. Then on jinite structures: 
1. Every formula of FP(Q) is expressible in 2&(Q). 
2. Every sentence in FP(Q) dejines a PTIME query. 
Leivant [38] defines the concept of a monotone language. By this he means 
a language L in which the concept of “positive occurrence” is defined and which 
satisfies the conditions: 
1. L is closed under first-order operations. 
2. For every formula cp and relation symbol R positive in cp, the formula 
W’(z) + Q(z)) + (vCPIR1 -+ vCQIR1) 
is valid. 
It is clear that if Q = {Qi: iEZ) is a collection of monotone simple unary generalized 
quantifiers, then FP(Q) and X&,,(Q) are monotone languages in the sense of Leivant. 
The following result follows from [38, Lemmas 3,4 and Theorem IV]. 
Proposition 2.14. Suppose Q = {Qi: i E I} is a collection of monotone simple unary 
generalized quantijers. Then FP(Q) is closed under negation, i.e. the negation of 
a formula of FP(Q) is always expressible in FP(Q). 
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2.5. Lindstriim quantijers 
The concept of a simple unary generalized quantifier was extended to quantifiers of 
arbitrary arity on the class Y of all structures by Lindstriim [39]. 
Definition 2.15. Let n be a positive integer. An n-ary generalized quantijer is a class 
Q of structures over the vocabulary consisting of an n-ary relation symbol P such that 
Q is closed under isomorphisms, i.e., ifA = (A, P”) is a structure in Q and B = (I?, PB) is 
a structure that is isomorphic to A, then B is also in Q. Let K be a class of structures 
and n a positive integer. An n-ary generalized quantijier on X is an n-ary generalized 
quantifier Q such that Q[8] c X[0]. 
Every class of equivalence relations that is closed under isomorphisms gives rise to 
a binary generalized quantifiers on Y. In particular, such a quantifier is provided by 
the class of all structures A = (A, E) with the property that E is an equivalence relation 
on A having infinitely many equivalence classes. For an example of a different nature, 
consider the well-ordering quantijer Q”‘ on the class Y of all structures: it consists of 
all structures A = (A, -?) such that the binary relation cA is a well-ordering of A. 
This quantifier is not expressible in first-order logic. Observe, however, that the 
restriction of the well-ordering quantifier Q”’ to the class % of all finite structures is 
first-order definable, since on finite structures well-orderings coincide with total- 
orderings. 
In general, every collection of finite graphs that is closed under isomorphisms gives 
rise to a binary generalized quantifier on the class % of all finite structures. For 
example, the connectivity quantifier consists of all finite connected graphs G = (V, E). 
With only notational modifications in Definition 2.6, we can define the syntax and 
semantics of the logics _Y&(Q), k 2 1, for families Q = {Qi: iel} of generalized 
quantifiers in which the arity of each quantifier Qi is at most k. 
Notice that n-ary generalized quantifiers always apply to a single formula. Lind- 
Strom [39] introduced more complex quantifiers that can apply to a pair of formulas 
or even to a finite sequence of formulas. 
Definition 2.16. Let (nI, . . . , n,) be a sequence of positive integers. A Lindstriim quanti- 
fier of type (nI, . . . , nl) is a class Q of structures over the vocabulary consisting of 
relation symbols PII . . . , Pl such that Pi is ni-ary for 1 Q i < 1 and Q is closed under 
isomorphisms. Let X be a class of structures and let (nl, . . . , n,) be a sequence of 
positive integers. A Lindstriim quantifier of type (nI, . . . , nl) on X is a Lindstrom 
quantifier Q of type (ni, . . . , nl) such that Q [0] E X [@I. 
Notice that n-ary generalized quantifiers are Lindstrom quantifiers of type (n). In 
the literature, n-ary generalized quantifiers are also known as simple Lindstrom 
quantifiers. One of the best-known examples of nonsimple quantifiers is the equicar- 
dinality or Hiirtig quantifier I. This is the Lindstriim quantifier of type (1,1) that 
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consists of all structures A = (A, X, Y) such that X G A, Y G A, and 1 Xl = 1 Y 1. There 
has been an extensive study of the model-theoretic properties of the Hartig quantifier 
I on the class Y of all structures (cf. [26]). Moreover, Chandra and Hare1 [l l] showed 
that on finite structures the Hartig quantifier is not expressible in fixpoint logic. The 
similarity quantijer S,, n 2 2, is the higher arity analog of the Hartig quantifier: it is of 
type (n, n) and consists of all structures A = (A, R, S) such that R E A”, S G A”, and the 
structure (A, R) is isomorphic to the structure (A, S). Another well-studied Lindstrom 
quantifier of type (1,1) is the quantifier MORE that consists of all structures 
A = (A, X, Y ) such that X E A, Y E A, and 1 X( > I Y I. This is also known as the 
Rescher quantifier. 
We can now define the syntax and the semantics of the infinitary logics 9kW(Q), 
k > 1, for families Q = (Qi: ie I} of arbitrary Lindstrom quantifiers, provided that the 
type (nl, . . . . nr) of every quantifier Qi in Q satisfies the inequality max {nl, . . . , nl} < k. 
At the level of syntax, we add the following construct: Let Qi be a quantifier in Q of 
type (nl, . . . . nJ, let Xj, 1 < j < 1, be nj-tuples of variables of 9&,JQ), let y be 
a sequence of variables of 9&,(Q), and let Cpi(Xi,y), 1< j 6 1, be formulas of P’&,,(Q) 
with free variables among the variables in the tuplexj and the tupley. We assume that 
the tuples Xj and y are all disjoint. Then the expression 
Qi(X 1~~~~,x,)(cpl(xl,Y)~‘..~cp~(xf~Y)) 
is also a formula of 9&(Q). A structure A with universe A and a tuple d of elements 
from the universe of A satisfy the above sentence if and only if the structure 
(4 @I: 4 41, d!= CPI(X,,Y)}, . . . (a,: A, (II, d b cpkxl,y)}) 
is in the quantifier Qi. 
In particular, for the Hlrtig quantifier I we have that 
if and only if 
l{a~A: A, a, d I= ~(x~,y)}l = l{b~A: A, b, d!= Wd}I. 
Note that the Hartig quantifier is readily definable from MORE. It was proved in [50] 
that MORE is not definable in 9&I). The exact relationship between these two 
quantifiers will be investigated in Section 5. 
Definition 2.17. A Lindstriim quantifier Q of type (ni , . . . , n,) on 9 is numerical if (A, 
R l,...,R,,)~Q and lRll =IRiI,...,IR,,I = IRb,l imply(A,R;,...,Rb,)EQ. 
Intuitively, a quantifier on % is numerical if it only refers to cardinalities of 
relations. Simple unary quantifiers on %, the Hartig quantifier I and MORE are good 
examples of numerical generalized quantifiers. We can easily think of other natural 
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ones, like: 
Q = ((A,R): R E A”, (RI 2 14”/2), 
Q = ((A, R): R c A”, /R 1 even>, 
Q = ((A,R,S): R, S c: A”, [RI = ISI>. 
Proposition 2.18. Let Q = {Qi: in Z} b e a ami f ‘ly f o numerical Lindstriim quantifiers on 
a class X of~nite structures and let k be a positive integer. If t&y) is a formula of the 
in~nitury logic &&,,(Q), then there is u form~lu $*(j) of the in~nitary logic A?&(C) with 
counting quuntijers and k variables uch that Ii/*(y) is equivalent to t&y) on structures in 
X. 
Proof. We use [n] to denote the set (1,. . . , n) and [n,mJ to denote the set (n, n + 
1 f-‘-1 m>. Let Qi be a numerical generalized quantifier of type (nl, . . . , n*). We prove 
that the sentence Q&, . . . ,xi)(P1(x,), . . . , 4(x!)) is definable in S&,(C). The rest of the 
proof goes as in the proof of Proposition 2.7. 
Let S, be the set of tuples s = (si, . . . , sq) of positive integers such that 
s1 + ... + sq = n. We denote the length q of s by Ih(s). Let 
T,: = ((s,f): s = (43 ~f~CO>~l, f= ~(l,O)~~, 
Tf+” = ((s, f): SE,!?,, f: [lh(s)J + Ti is one to one>. 
Suppose t = (s, f)~ T i’-“‘, where 0 6 m < nj. Let 
rpn j-O = Pj(X,, ..I, x& 
wi 
Cpitzi$ 3!SiX,+1cp~“i’(Xl,...,Xm+1). 
Suppose t = (s, f) E T :J. A structure ([n], Rj), Rj E [n]“, satisfies cp’,.’ if and only if 
lRj\ = c(t), where the number c(t) is defined as follows: 
c(0) = 1, 
Ihfst 
C(t) = z Si*C(f(i))* 
i=l 
Now, a structure ([n], R1, . . . . R,) is in Qi if and only if it satisfies the sentence: 
V(3!nx(x=x)~~~~“~~~~~~(Pf;‘~:t~~T~fori=l,...,Zand 
([~I~ c’it~)v **-t dtd)EQif- q 
If we combine the main result of Cai et al. [9] and Proposition 2.18, we get the 
following corollary. 
Corollary 2.19. Let Q = (Qj: i E f f be ufamily of numerical ~indstr~m qua~t~~ers on the 
class X of all finite graphs. Then there are polynomial-time properties that are not 
expressible by any formula of the infinitury logic Z&JQ) on X. 
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Let us call a Lindstrom quantifier of type (&I, . . . , 1) unary. Not all unary quanti- 
fiers are numerical, for example the class of structures (A, X, Y ), where X, Y c A and 
[Xn Y 1 is even. However, Proposition 2.18 and Corollary 2.19 hold for all unary 
Lindstrom quantifiers. 
Proposition 2.20. Let Q = {Qi: ie I} be a family of unary Lindstrom quantifiers on 
a class X ofjinite structures and let k be a positive integer. If $(y) is a formula of the 
injnitary logic Y:,(Q), then there is aformula $*(J) of the injnitary logic _Y’~,(C) with 
counting quantijers and k variables such that tj*(y) is equivalent to 11/(y) on structures in 
X. Moreover, ifX is the class offmite graphs, then there are polynomial-time properties 
that are not expressible by any formula of the infinitary logic S?&,,(Q) on X. 
Proof. The proof is almost identical with that of Proposition 2.18 and is therefore 
omitted. 0 
Thus there is no hope of capturing all of PTIME by combining even infinitely many 
numerical or unary Lindstrom quantifiers with the infinitary logic _!?&,. Hella [25] 
proved the stronger result that for any positive integer m there is a polynomial-time 
property of finite structures which is not expressible in any -49&(Q), where Q is 
a possibly infinite sequence of Lindstrom quantifiers Qj of type (n{, . . . , ni) and n{ 6 m 
foralli=l,...,l. 
3. Pebble games for logics with generalized quantifiers 
In algebra the fundamental criterion for distinguishing two structures is whether or 
not they are isomorphic. From the standpoint of a logic _fZ’, two structures are 
indistinguishable in 2 if they satisfy exactly the same sentences of 2. This is the key 
concept for analyzing the expressive power of a logic 9 and for comparing it to other 
logics. In this section we study equivalence in the logics y&(Q), k 2 1, and character- 
ize it in terms of certain infinitary pebble games. For simplicity, we first give the 
definitions and prove the results for families Q = {Qi: iel} of simple unary general- 
ized quantifiers. 
Definition 3.1. Let Q = (Qi: i E Z} a sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers, 
A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. 
l Assume that aI, . . . , a,,, and bI, . . . , 6, are finite sequences of distinct elements from 
the universes of A and B, respectively, where 1 < m < k. We write 
(Aa I, ...> a,) -P';,(Q) (4 bl, . . . , b,) 
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to denote that for every formula cp(u 1, . . . , u,) of _YL,(Q) with free variables among 
ul, . . . , u, we have that 
A,ai ,..., a,lcp(ul ,..., a,) ifandonlyifB,br ,..., b,kcp(ul ,..., a,). 
l We say that A is L&j,,(Q)-equiudent to B, and we write A zy&,(Q)B, if A and 
B satisfy the same sentences of Z?&,(Q). 
0 We write.A zip:, B to denote that A and B satisfy the same sentences of _Yk,. 
Barwise [7] and Immerman [27] showed that the equivalence relation Em:, can be 
characterized in terms of the following k-pebble game between two Players I and II on 
two structures A and B. The two players take turns and place pebbles on elements of 
A and B, with Player I choosing first one of the two structures and placing a pebble on 
an element of it and with Player II responding by placing a pebble on an element of 
the other structure. Let Ui (bi) be the element of the structure A (resp. B) pebbled in the 
ith move. After k pebbles have been placed on each structure, if the mapping ai H bi+ 
1 < i d k, is not a partial isomor~~~sm between A and B (i.e., an isomorphism between 
the substructures of A and B generated by the ai’s and the bls respectively), then 
Player I wins. Otherwise, Player I removes one pair of corresponding pebbles and the 
game resumes until again k pebbles have been placed on each structure. We say that 
Player II wins the k-pebble game on A and B if he can continue playing “forever”. 
Barwise [7] and Immerman [27] showed that A eYi, B if and only if Player II wins 
the k-pebble game on A and B. This theorem has become the main technical tool for 
showing that certain properties are not expressible in the infinitary logic _Y’&,, on finite 
structures (cf. [27,34,9,30-j). 
The question that now arises is: can k-pebble games be modified in such a way that 
the resulting games capture equivalence in the infinitary logics Z&,,(Q), k 2 l? 
A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for equivalence relative to first-order logic 
with Lindstrom quantifiers was given in [49]. A game that captures 5&,,(Q)-equiva- 
lence for monotone simple unary Q was introduced in [37]. A back and forth 
characterization of _YU,(Q)-equivalence for arbitrary Q was given in [lo]. A pebble 
game that captures 5?:,(C)-equivalence was introduced in [9,30]. We shall intro- 
duce next a new pebble game that is capable of capturing Z&(Q)-equivalence for 
arbitrary quantifiers. An inspection of the proof of the theorem of Barwise [7] and 
Immerman [27] shows that the pebbling of elements of A and B corresponds to 
finding witnesses for the existential and the universal quantifier. This observation 
suggests that the first step towards finding games that characterize 5?&JQ)-equiva- 
lence is to allow additional types of moves that correspond to the presence of 
generalized quantifiers in the logic. The idea is to allow the two players to choose 
first structures in one of the quantifiers Qi, i E I, and then to place pebbles on elements 
of these structures. We formalize this idea by introducing a new pebble game which 
will then be refined further to yield the desired game that captures equivalence in 
I&,- 
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Definition 3.2. Let Q = {Qi: i E Z} be a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers 
on X, A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. The (k,Q)-pebble game 
between Players I and II on the structures A and B has the following rules: in each 
move Player I can play as in the k-pebble game (and Player II must resopond with 
a move in that game) or Player I can choose one of the structures A and B, say A, 
a quantifier Qj from the family Q, and a subset X of the universe A of A such that the 
structure (A,X) is in the quantifier Qj. Player II must respond by choosing a subset 
Y of the universe of the other structure (in this case Y must be a subset of the universe 
B of B) such that the structure (B, Y ) is in the quantifier Qj. Then Player I places 
a pebble on an element b, of B and Player II must respond by placing a pebble on an 
element ai ofA such that ai EX o bI E Y. After this, Player I chooses again one of the 
two structures and the game continues this way until k pebbles have been placed on 
each structure. Let ai and hi, 1 < i < k, be the elements of A and B, respectively, 
pebbled by the two players in the ith move. If the mapping ai H bi, 1 < i d k, fails to 
be a partial isomorphism between A and B, then Player I wins. Otherwise, Player I 
removes one pair of corresponding pebbles and the game resumes until k pebbles have 
been placed on each structure. If the game lasts for infinitely many moves without 
Player I winning, then Player II is declared the winner. 
At first sight, the (k, Q)-pebble game appears to be the “correct” extension of the 
k-pebble game and a good candidate for capturing equivalence in the infinitary logics 
2’: o(Q), k 9 1. It turns out, however, that the (k, Q)-game is too strong, in the sense 
that it provides a sufficient condition for 2&,(Q)-equivalence, but not a necessary 
one. Indeed, later on we will prove that if Player II wins the (k, Q)-pebble game on two 
structures A and B, then the two structures atisfy the same sentences of y&,(Q). We 
will also show that the converse may fail for particular simple unary generalized 
quantifiers. We next introduce a refinement of the (k, Q)-pebble game in which Player I 
has less freedom in choosing his moves and, as a result, Player II has a better chance to 
win. 
Definition 3.3. Let Q = (Qi: iel) a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers, 
A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. The definable (k, Q)-pebble game 
between Players I and II on the structures A and B has the same rules as the 
(k, Q)-pebble game with the following exception in the moves of Player I: the sets 
chosen by Player I must be definable in 9&JQ) with the elements of the structures 
that have pebbles on them as parameters. More specifically, assume it is Player’s 
I turn to make a move and that the corresponding pairs of pebbled elements are 
(ui, b,), . . . , (a,, b,). If Player I chooses one of the two structures, say A, a quantifier Qj 
in the family Q, and a set X E A such that the structure (A, X) is in Qj, then there must 
exist a formula cp(ui, . , u,, u) of .9!_(Q) with free variables are among ui, . , u,, u 
such that 
X={uEA:A,ul )...) U,,UkqJ(U~ ).,.) um,u)}. 
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The rules for Player II are the same as in the (k, Q)-pebble game. In particular, Player 
II is not required to play sets that are definable in sPkw(Q) with parameters the 
currently pebbled elements. 
We now can state and prove one of the main results of this section. 
Theorem 3.4. Assume that Q = (Qi: in I> is a sequence of simple unary generalized 
quant~~ers, A and B are two structures, and k is a positive integer. Then the fallowing 
statements are equivalent: 
(i) A -L.X,,(Q)B* 
(ii) Player II has a winning strategy for the definable (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
If the models A and B are&&e, we have a third equivulent condition: 
(iii) A =_Lb,(Q)B. 
Proof. Let us assume first A ELI,,(Q) B. We have to describe the winning strategy of 
Player II. The strategy is as follows: Suppose pebbles have been put up to now on 
elements a,, . . . . a, of A and elements bl, . . . , b, of B, where r < k. During the game 
Player II will maintain the condition: 
(Aa I, . . . ,a,) ‘[AL,,(Q) (B, b,, . . ., bd (1) 
The strategy of Player II for those moves of Player I that are actually moves in the 
ordinary k-pebble game is the same as in the ordinary k-pebble game. For details on 
that we refer to [35, Theorem 2.161. Let us then assume Player I moves a subset X of, 
say A, so that (A, X) E Qi for some i E I. We additionally assume that X is definable by 
a formula cp(x,zl, . . . , z,) of 9kJQ) with al, . . . , a, as parameters, i.e. 
X={a~A:A,cz,a, ,..., a,I=cp(x,z, ,..., z,)>. 
The strategy of Player II is to play the set 
Y = (b&3:B,b,bl ,..., b,t=cp(x,z, ,..., zr)}. 
By applying the equivalence (1) to the formula Qixtp(x, zl,. . . , z,) we see that 
(B, Y ) E Qi. Therefore this is a legal move for Player II. Next Player I puts his pebble 
on an element b of B. 
Case 1. b E Y. The strategy of Player II is to put his pebble on an element a of X so 
that 
(A,a,a~, .. . > 4 -L&,(Q) (4 b, bl> .. ., hf. 
We claim that this is possible. Indeed, suppose it is not. Then for every a E X there is 
a formula (~o(x,zi, . . , z,) of 9:,(Q) so that A,a,al, . . . , a, b (po(x,zl, .. . , z,) but 
B, b, b,, . . . , b, i fpa(x,zl, .. . , z,). So 
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By(l)againB,b,b,,...,b,~V,,x~~(x,zl,..., z,) which contradicts the choice of the 
formulas cp,(x, zl, . . . , z,). This is the only point, where we need extra care in case we 
have assumed (iii) only. But if A is finite, then so is X, and the above big disjunction is 
actually finite. 
Case 2. b$ Y: Replace in Case 1 the formula q(x,zl, . . , z,) everywhere by its 
negation, and X by its complement. 
This ends the description of the winning strategy of Player II. 
We shall now assume that Player II has a winning strategy r and prove A -Lt w(Q, B. 
We use induction on the structure of q(zr, . . . , z,) to prove that A,al, . . . , a, 1 
cp(z Ir . . . , z,) if and only B, bl, . . . , b, 1 cp(z,, .. . , z,), whenever the sequences al, . . . , a, 
and b 1, . . . , b, (without repetitions) represent apebble position on a round of the game 
and Player II has been playing the strategy r. There are different cases to consider. We 
refer to the proof of [35, Theorem 2.161 for details concerning all but one case, 
namely, the case that (p(zl, . . . , z,) is of the form Qixll/(x,zl, . . . , z,), where x is 
a variable different from zl, . . . , z,. Let us assume A,al, . . , a, k cp(zl, . . . , z,) . Let 
X={aEA:A,a,a* )..., a,k$(x,z, )... ?z-,,) 
Then (A, X) E Qi. We let Player I play the set X as his next move. The strategy z directs 
Player II to play some subset Y of B so that (B, Y ) E Qi. We claim that 
Y=(b~B2,b,b~ ,..., b,I$(x,zI ,..., zr)>. 
Indeed, suppose it is not so. 
Case 1. There is some beY -{beB: B,b,bI ,..., b,I$(x,zI ,..., z,)}: We let 
Player I put his pebble on this b. The strategy r directs Player II to put his pebble on 
some a E A. Since t is a winning strategy and because of our induction hypothesis, 
necessarilyaEX-{aEA:A,a,a, ,..., a,k$(x,z, ,..., z,)}, which contradicts the def- 
inition of X. 
Case 2. There is some bE {b EB: B, b, bI, ,.. , 6, + rl/(x, zl,. . . , z,)} - Y: The strategy 
7 directs Player II to put his pebble on some UEA. Necessarily a~ {a~ A: 
A,a,ar )...) U,kll/(X,Zi ,...) z*)> - X, which contradicts again the definition of X. 
We have proved the claim and B, bl,. , b, b cp(zI, . . . , zr) follows. q 
Notice that although Player II need not play definable sets in the definable 
(k, Q)-pebble game, the above proof shows that he may do so, if he wants to. As 
a consequence of Theorem 3.4 we obtain the following game-theoretic haracteriza- 
tion of definability in the logics 9:,(Q), k 2 1, for classes of finite structures. 
Proposition 3.5. Let Q = {Qi: i E Z> be a family of simple unary generalized quanti$ers 
on the class 9 of allfinite structures, Jet X be a class offinite structures over cr, and Jet 
k be a positive integer. Then the following statements are equivalent: 
1. The cJass X is 3&,(Q)-definable, i.e., there is a sentence cp of 9!&(Q) such that 
for any Jinite structure A over ct we have that 
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2. If A and B are finite structures over o such that A E x and Player II has a winning 
strategy in the definable (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B, then BE xx. 
Proof. Let us suppose condition 2 holds. For any o-structure A, let (PA be the 
conjunction of all Y&(Q)-sentences true in A. Let $ be the disjunction of all sentences 
(PA, where A E 37. If A E J?, then trivially A \ t,G. On the other hand, if B I$, e.g. B b (PA, 
where A E 3?, then Player II wins the definable (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. Hence 
by condition 2, BEG?. 0 
The preceding results lead to the following method for establishing nonexpressibil- 
ity results in the infinitary logic L&,(Q): I n order to prove that a property 9 of 
structures is not expressible by any formula of L&,(Q), it sufhces to show that for any 
k > 1 there are structures Ak and Bk such that Ak \ 9, Bk It 9, and Player II has 
a winning strategy for the definable (k, Q)-pebble game on Ak and Bk. 
Observe that this method is guaranteed to be complete by Proposition 3.5, i.e., if the 
property B is not expressible in L”,, (Q), then such structures Ak and Bk must exist for 
every k> 1. 
It is obvious that if Player II has a winning strategy for the (k, Q)-pebble game on 
two structures A and B, then he also has a winning strategy for the definable 
(k, Q)-pebble game on these two structures. Consequently, the above method can be 
modified to require that Player II has a winning strategy for the (k, Q)-pebble game on 
the structures Ak and Bk, for each k B 1. This modified method, however, is not always 
complete, because there are quantifiers for which the two pebble games are not 
equivalent (see below). 
Although it is easier for Player II to win the definable (k, Q)-pebble game than the 
(k, Q)-pebble game, in practice it may be hard to describe a winning strategy, because 
this requires an analysis of 5&,,(Q)-definability on the structures on which the game is 
played. Nevertheless, quite often it is possible to describe a winning strategy for Player 
II in the following invariant (k, Q)-game, which is a modification of the other two 
pebble games and has intermediate strength. 
Definition 3.6. Let Q = {Qi: i E I} be a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers, 
A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. 
1. Assume that a,, . . . , a,,, are elements of A and X is a subset of A. If h(X) = X for 
any automorphism h of the structure A such that h(aI) = al, . . . , h(a,) = a,,,, then we 
say that X is invariant under automorphisms of A that fix al, . . . , a,,,. 
2. The invariant (k, Q)-pebble game between Players I and II on the structures A and 
B has the same rules as the (k, Q)-pebble game with the following exception in the 
moves of Player I: the sets chosen by Player I must be invariant under automorphisms 
of the structures that fix the currently pebbled elements of the structures. More 
specifically, assume it is Player’s I turn to make a move and that the corresponding 
pairs of pebbled elements are (aI, b,), . . . , (a,,,, b,). If Player I chooses one of the two 
structures, say A, a quantifier Qj in the family Q, and a set X E A such that the 
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structure (,4,X) is in Qj, then X must be invariant under automorphisms ofA that fix 
21, ... , a,. A similar condition must hold if Player I chooses a set Y E B. The rules for 
Player II are the same as in the (k, Q)-pebble game. In particular, Player II is not 
required to play sets that are invariant under such automorphisms. 
It is obvious that a winning strategy for Player II in the (k, @-pebble game is also 
a winning strategy for him in the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game. The next theorem 
describes relations between the three pebble games introduced here. Let Q= l,Z be the 
simple unary quantifier consisting of all structures (A, X) such that A is a finite set and 
X is a subset of A of cardinality L IA I,/.2 J, where if x is a nonnegative real number, then 
Lx 1 is the greatest integer less than or equal to x. 
Theorem 3.7. Let Q = {Qi: iE I] be a family of simple unary generalized quant$ers, 
A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. 
l If Player II has a winning strategy for the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B, then 
he also has a winning strategy for the dejinable (k, Q)-pebble on these two structures. 
l For every pos~tiue integer k 2 1 there are~nite graphs Gk and Hk such that Pfayer II 
has a winning strategy for the invariant fk, Q= ~~~)-pebble game on Gk and Hk, but 
Player I has a winning strategy for the (k, Q= &-pebble game on Gk and Hk. 
0 For every positive integer k > 2 there arefinite graphs Gk and Hk such that Player 1X 
has a winning strategy for the definable (k, Q= I,z)-pebble game on Gk and Hk, but 
Player I has a winning strategy for the invariant (k, Q= ,,,)-pebble game (and, hence 
.for the (k, Q= ,,,)-pebble game) on Gk and Hk. 
Proof. Sets which are Y:,(Q)-definable with parameters are obviously invariant 
under automo~hisms that fix these parameters. This observation yields the first part 
of the proposition. 
For a proof of the second part, Let Gk consist of cliques Ci of size 2k for 1 9 i < 2k, 
and Hk of cliques Di of size 2k for 1 < i < 2k - 2. 
At first we prove that Player I has a winning strategy for the (k, Q= &pebble game 
on Gk and Hk. During the first k - 1 rounds of the game Player I puts his pebbles into 
the cliques Ci, i < k. NOW comes the Q= lj2-move: Player I plays a subset X of Gk 
which contains 2k - 1 elements from each Ci for k d i < 2k. So the cardinality of X is 
(2k - 1)k = /G,//2 and therefore this is a legal move. Suppose Player II plays a set 
Y 5 Hk of / Hkl/2 = (2k - 3)k elements. Unless Player II has lost the game already, 
there are but k - 2 unpebbled cliques in Ilk left. They contain altogether (2k - 4)k 
elements. Hence Y has to meet a pebbled clique Di in an element h. Now Player I plays 
his last pebble on the element h, and wins. 
We shall then prove that Player II has a winning strategy for the definable 
(k, Q = &-pebble game on Gk and Hk. It is obvious that Player II wins if he can count 
on Player I never making a Q= 1,2-move. Hence it suffices to show that Player I 
cannot play a Q = l,2-move, i.e. the quantifier Q = l,2 contains no subsets of Gk or Z& 
definable in &&,,(Q= 1j2) with k - 1 parameters. For this end, suppose X is a subset of 
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Gk or Hk definable in Uk,,(Q= i/J from the parameters al, . . . , a,, where r < k. Let 
A = {ai,..., a,> and X’ = X - A. We use the fact that X is closed under automor- 
phisms of the structure that fix the elements al, . . . , a,. There are two useful conse- 
quences of this fact. First, if X’ meets a clique K, then X contains all elements of 
K - A. Second, if X’ meets a clique K with K n A = 8, then X contains all cliques 
K with Kn A = 8. These observations help us estimate the size of X. 
Case 1: X is a subset of Gk. If X meets only cliques that meet A, then 
1x1 < (k - 1)2k < I G,1/2. If X meets a clique that does not meet A, then 
1x1 3 2k2 > /G,//‘2. 
Case 2: X is a subset of Hk. If X’ meets at least k - 1 cliques, then 
1x1 2 IX’1 3 (k - 1)2k -(k - 1) > 2k2 - 3k = l&l/2. 
If X’ meets at most k - 2 cliques, then 
/XI < IX’/ + k - 1 d (k - 2)2k + k - 1 < 2k* - 3k = lH&‘2. 
In either case X cannot have exactly one half of the elements of the universe. 
The proof of the third part will be a modification of the proof of the second part. The 
graph Gk consists of cliques Ci of size 2k for 1 < i < k and of cliques Di of size k for 
1 < i < 2k. The graph Hk consists of cliques Ei of size 2k for 1 < i < k. Player I wins 
the invariant (k, Q= &-pebble game on GI, and Hk as follows. He plays his first k - 1 
pebbles in different cliques Ci and then plays the set X = ui 6isk Ci of size 
2k2 = 1 Gk l/2. Note that X is invariant under automorphisms that fix the pebbled 
elements. Unless Player II has lost already, he has played his k - 1 pebbles on 
different cliques Ei. Now he plays a subset Y of Hk of size k2 = I Hk l/2. The set Y has to 
contain the elements pebbled by Player II up to now or else he loses immediately. 
Since k - 1 sets Ei contribute altogether (k - 1)2k elements, Y has to miss an element 
y from at least one clique Ei which has a pebble in it. Now Player I plays y and 
wins. 
Next we prove that Player II has a winning strategy in the definable (k, Q= 1,2)- 
pebble game on Gk and fjk. The point is, of course, that the set X played above by 
Player I is not definable. Let A be either Gk or Hk. Let ai, . . . , a, be elements of A with 
n < k. Let [ai] denote the clique that ai is in. Let Z denote the union of the cliques of 
A which have no pebbles. For any Y c A let Y * = Y - {al, . . . , a,}. 
Claim. Suppose X is de~n~ble in _%‘&, from the parameters a,, . . . , ~1,. Then X is a union 
O~SHS ~~~~e~r~ (ai>, [at]* and Z*. 
Proof. An immediate consequence of the fact that X is definable in U&, from the 
parameters al, . . . , a,, is that if 
(4 a it...rant-~) =_~~~(A,~,,...,~n,y) 
and x E X, then also y E X. Thus if X meets [ai]*, then [ai J* C: X, and if X meets Z*, 
then Z* c X. The claim is proved. 0 
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It follows easily from the claim that 1x1 # (Al/2. Thus, if cp(al, . . . , ~“,x)E _Y$,,, 
then 
AkQ=1,2xq(u, ,..., u,,x)cr3xlx=x. 
So Player I will not be able to play a definable subset of A of cardinality IA l/2. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that Player II wins the ordinary k-pebble game on Gk 
and Hk. 0 
In the sequel we will make heavy use of the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game in 
establishing that certain properties 9 are not expressible by any formula of Z&(Q) 
on finite structures. For this, it will be enough to show that for any k 2 1 there are 
structures Ak and Bk such that Ak k 9, Bk g 9, and Player II has a winning strategy for 
the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on Ak and Bk. 
The quantifier Q = 1,2 used to separate the different versions of (k, Q)-games, is 
nonmonotone. This is not an accident, because it turns out that if the quantifiers in 
Q are monotone, then all the games: (k, Q)-pebble game, definable (k, Q)-pebble game, 
and invariant (k, Q)-pebble game, are equivalent. As a matter of fact, for monotone 
quantifiers all three games are equivalent to a somewhat simpler game that we 
describe next. 
Definition 3.8. Let Q = {Qi: in Z} a family of simple unary generalized quantifiers, 
A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. The monotone (k, Q)-pebble game 
between Players I and II on the structures A and B has the following rules: in each 
move Player I can play as in the k-pebble game (and Player II must respond with 
a move in that game) or Player I can choose one of the structures A and B, say A, 
a quantifier Qj from the family Q, and a subset X of the universe A of A such that the 
structure (A, X) is in the quantifier Qj. Player II must respond by choosing a subset 
Y of the universe of the other structure (in this case Y must be a subset of the universe 
B of B) such that the structure (B, Y) is in the quantifier Qj, Then Player I places 
a pebble on an element b1 E Y and Player II must respond by placing a pebble on an 
element ai EX. After this, Player I chooses again one of the two structures and the 
game continues this way until k pebbles have been placed on each structure. Let ai and 
bi, 1 < i Q k, be the elements of A and B, respectively, pebbled by the two players in 
the ith move. If the mapping ai H bi, 1 < i 6 k, fails to be a partial isomorphism 
between A and B, then Player I wins. Otherwise, Player I removes one pair of 
corresponding pebbles and the game resumes until k pebbles have been placed on 
each structure. If the game lasts for infinitely many moves without Player I winning, 
then Player II is declared the winner. 
Notice that the only difference between the (k, Q)-pebble game and the monotone 
(k, Q)-pebble game is that Player I is restricted to choose elements in the sets played by 
Player II, while in the (k, Q)-pebble game he is also allowed to choose elements in the 
complements of these sets. In general, the monotone (k, Q)-pebble game is strictly 
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weaker than the (k, Q)-pebble game, but the two games are equivalent o each other if 
the quantifiers happen to be monotone. 
Theorem 3.9. Let Q = { Qi: i E I> a family of monotone simple unary generalized quanti- 
fiers, A and B two structures, and k a positive integer. Then thefollowing statements are 
equivalent: 
(i) A =L&(Q)B. 
(ii) Player II has a winning strategy for the (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
(iii) Player II has a winning strategy for the monotone (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
(iv) Player II has a winning strategy for the dejnable (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
(v) Player II has a winning strategy for the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
Furthermore, ifthe models A and B arehnite, we can add another equivalent condition: 
(Vi) A -y;u,Q) B. 
Proof. This theorem is proved by establishing(i) 3 (ii) and (iii) * (i). The result then 
follows from this fact, the preceding Theorem 3.4, and Proposition 3.7. 
To prove (i) * (ii), we suppose A EL&.(Q) B. We have to describe the winning 
strategy of Player II in the (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. The strategy is as follows: 
Suppose pebbles have been put up to now on elements al, . . . , a, of A and elements 
b 1, . . . , b, of B, where r < k. Part of the strategy is that 
k&a 1, . . . , a,) =L&,(Q) (4 h, . . . , b,). (2) 
Therefore, we need not describe the strategy for those moves of Player I that are 
actually moves in the ordinary k-pebble game. Let us then assume Player I moves 
a subset X of, say A, so that (A, X)E Qi for some iE I. For any a E A let 
(po(x,z1, . .. . z,) E L”,,(Q) be the conjunction of all formulas cp(x, zl, . . . , z,.) E Lie(Q) 
forwhichA,a,a, ,..., a,Icp(x,z, ,..., z,). Notice that at first sight there is a problem in 
taking this conjunction, because the collection of formulas of 5&,(Q) is a proper 
class. However, by focusing on sets of nonequivalent formulas we can restrict our- 
selves to a conjunction over a set of formulas. If we assume (vi) rather than (i), we can 
observe at this point that there are only finitely many formulas of 9Lw(Q) which are 
pairwise nonequivalent on A. Let X’ be the set of elements a of A for which there is an 
element a* E X so that A, a, al,. . . , a, \ q&x, zl,. . . , z,). Clearly, X E X’. Therefore 
(A, X’)EQ~. Note that aE X’ if and only if A, a,al, . . . , a, b VCEx (pe(x,zl, . . . , z,). The 
strategy of Player II is to play the set 
Y= bEB:B,b,bl ,..., b,IVcp,(x,zl ,..., z,) . 
CCX I 
By our assumption (2), (B, Y ) E Qi. Therefore this is a legal move for Player II. Next 
Player I puts his pebble on an element b of B. The strategy of Player II is to put his 
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pebble on an element a of A so that UEX if and only if bE Y and 
(A,a,al,...,a,)-~~~(~,(B,b,b,,...,b,). (3) 
If it happens to be the case that bE Y, then we can pick a EX so that 
B,b,bl,..., b, + cpD,(x, zl . . , z,), and this choice satisfies the condition (3). 
Let us then consider the case that b$ Y. Suppose no a$ X can be found with (3). 
Then for every u$X’ there is a formula I//,(x, zl, . . . , z,) of L&,(Q) so that 
A,a,al,..., a, l= $Jx,zi, . . . , z,) and B, b, bl, . . . , b, 6 t+ho(x,zl, . .. , z,). 
so 
4~ I,..., a,+vx v (PC(X,Zl,..., 
( 
z,)V v &a(X,Zl,‘..,G) . 
CEX 0$X’ 1 
Writing this formula in _C&JQ) in case we only assumed (vi) is possible, since then X’ 
and X are finite. By (2) again, B, b, bl, . . . , b, != Vacxp $Jx, zl, . . . , z,) which contradicts 
the choice of the formulas $Jx,zlr . . . , z,). 
This ends the description of the winning strategy of Player II. 
To prove (iii) * (i), we shall assume that Player II has a winning strategy r in the 
monotone (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B and prove A -L*,,(Q) B. We use induction on 
the structure of cp(zi, . . . , z,) to prove that A,ul, . . . , a, k cp(zl, . . . , z,) if and only if 
B,b i, . . . , b,t= cp(zl, . . . . z,), whenever the sequences ai, . . . , a, and bl, . . . , b, represent 
a pebble position (without repetitions) on a round of the game and Player II has been 
playing the strategy z. The only relevant case here is that cp(zi, . . . , z,) is of the form 
Qix$(X,Z1,..., zr), where x is a variable different from zl, . . . , z,. Let us assume 
A,q, . . , a, b cp(zl, . . . , z,). Let 
X={UEA:A,U,U, ,..., u,~$(x,z, ,..., zJ>. 
Then (A, X) E Qi. We let Player I play the set X as his next move. The strategy t directs 
Player II to play some subset Y of B so that (B, Y ) E Qi. We claim that 
YE {bd B,b,bl ,..., b,b$(x,zl ,..., zJ}. 
Suppose not. Then there is some be Y with B, b, bl, . . . , b, \l $(x,zl, . . . , z,). We let 
Player I put his pebble on this b. The strategy r directs Player II to put his pebble on 
some USA. Since z is a winning strategy, we have by the induction hypothesis, 
A,u,q ,..., u,b$(x,z, ,... , z,), which contradicts the definition of X. We have proved 
the claim and B, bl, . . . , b, \ cp(zl, . . . , z,) follows. f’J 
Elementary equivalence relative to 5&,(Q), where Q is a sequence of arbitrary 
Lindstrom quantifiers, can be defined by following the above general guidelines. 
Definition3.10. Let Q = {Qi: ill} a f amily of Lindstrom quantifiers, A and B two 
structures, and k a positive integer. Let Qj be of type (nj,, . . . , nij). The (k, Q)-pebble 
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game between Players I and II on the structures A and B has the following rules: in 
each move Player I can play as in the k-pebble game (and Player II must respond with 
a move in that game) or Player I can choose one of the structures A and B, say A, 
a quantifier Qj from the family Q, and sets X1 c A”‘, . . . , Xlj G A”IJ such that the 
structure (A, X1, . . . , Xlj) is in the quantifier Qj. Player II must respond by choosing 
sets Y1 E B”1, . . . . Ylj E B”IJ such that the structure (B, Y i, . . . , Ylj) is in the quantifier 
Qj. Then Player I places pebbles on ni-tuples bi, where i = 1, . . . , lj, of B and Player II 
must respond by placing pebbles on ni-tuples Ili, where i = 1, . . . , lj, of B such that 
aiEXi 0 biE Yi for i = 1, . . . . lj. After this, Player I chooses again one of the two 
structures and the game continues this way until k pebbles have been placed on each 
structure. Let ai and bi, 1 d i < k, be the elements ofA and B, respectively, pebbled by 
the two players in the ith move. If the mapping ai H biy 1 d i 6 k, fails to be a partial 
isomorphism between A and B, then Player I wins. Otherwise, Player I removes one 
pair of corresponding pebbles and the game resumes until k pebbles have been placed 
on each structure. If the game lasts for infinitely many moves without Player I 
winning, then Player II is declared the winner. 0 
It should be clear how inouriant and dejnuble (k, Q)-pebble game is now defined for 
Lindstrom quantifiers Q. The proofs of Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 work for Lindstrtim 
quantifiers with only notational chances. We call a Lindstrom quantifier Q of type 
(n l,*.*, nl) monotone, if (A, Xi,. . . , X,) E Q and 
xi cx; GA”I,...,X,cX;GA”~ 
imply(A,X;,..., Xi) E Q. Then Theorem 3.9 holds for monotone Lindstriim quanti- 
fiers and its proof needs only notational changes. 
4. Structural properties of simple unary generalized quantifiers 
In this section we apply the (k, Q)-pebble games to the study of structural properties 
of simple unary generalized quantifiers. All structures considered are assumed to be 
finite. In the first part we study monotone simple unary generalized quantifiers. We 
show that the unbounded ones are not expressible by the bounded ones and vice 
versa. We also define what it means for a quantifier to relutiuize, and characterize 
counting quantifiers as the only monotone simple unary quantifiers which relativize. 
In the second part we show that a result of Corredor [13] on a subfamily of all simple 
unary quantifiers can be generalized to the context of infinitary logic with a fixed 
number of variables. 
4.1. Monotone and counting quantifiers 
In Proposition 2.5 we observed that every simple unary monotone quantifier falls 
into one of the three categories: eventually counting, eventually bounded, and 
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unbounded. We shall now prove that the first two categories are closed under logical 
definability and the only one that contains relativizing quantifiers is the first category. 
Proposition 4.1. Suppose Q and Q’ are monotone simple unary generalized quantifiers 
and both nonexpressible in _Ymw. 
1. If Q is eventually bounded and Q’ is expressible in Y&,(Q), then Q’ is also 
eventually bounded. 
2. If Q is unbounded, rQfn) is a monotone~unction, and Q’ is expressible in Z&,(Q), 
then Q’ is also unbounded. 
Proof. Suppose Q is eventually bounded, that is, there is a positive integer N, and two 
finite sets Si = {rl, . . . , r!j, and Sz = {si, . . . . s,} of nonnegative integers such that the 
following hold: 
l Si and SZ are nonempty (the case that one of them is empty is easier). 
o For every n > N there is a j such that either 1 d j < I and r&n) = rj, or 1 < j < m 
and rQ(n) = n - sj. 
e The function rp(n) takes each one of the values rj, 1 < j < Z, and n - sj, 1 Q j 6 m, 
infinitely often. 
Towards a contradiction, suppose Q’ is an unbounded monotone simple unary 
quantifier definable in 9%,(Q). This implies that there is a positive integer n so that 
tIMX(ri: i= l,..., I} + k < raS(n) and max{si: i = 1, . . . , m} + k < n - rot(n). 
Let G be the vocabulary consisting of a unary predicate P. We construct two 
structures A and B over o so that the following hold: 
(i) Player II wins the invariant (~,Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
(ii) A E Q’ and B$ Q’. 
The universe of both A and B is [n]. In addition, PA = [rQf(n)] and PE = 
[rQ8(n) - 11. Condition (ii) is satisfied by construction. To prove condition (i), suppose 
r < k pebbles have been used and Player I plays an invariant subset X of A or B with 
{XI 2 ra(n). Let X’ be the part of X which has no pebbles. By considering separately 
the cases that X’ meets P and its complement, X’ meets only P, X’ meets only the 
complement of P, and x’ = 8, one shows easily that Player II can choose Y c B with 
1 Y / B rQ(n) so that whatever y E Y Player I pebbles, Player II can find x E X preserving 
the partial isomorphism property. This ends the proof of I. 
The proof of 2 is similar. 0 
Proposition 4.2. Suppose Q is a monotone simple unary quantijier and Q is expressible in 
_YgO. Then Q is eventually counting. 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4.1. •l 
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Corollary 4.3. Suppose Q is a monotone simple unary quantifier. Then the following 
conditions are equivalent: 
(i) Q is expressible in ZD,. 
(ii) Q is expressible in LZ&,,. 
(iii) Q is eventually counting. 
Intuitively speaking a quantifier has the relativization property, if whatever it says 
of the universe, it can also say of the restriction of the universe into a unary predicate. 
For example, suppose we have the quantifier Q = ((A, X): X E A, 1x1 2 JA l/2}. With 
this quantifier we can say things like “At least half of the vertices are colored red and 
have degree 3”. If this quantifier was relativizing, we could also say things like “At 
least half of red vertices have degree 3”. 
Suppose cr is a vocabulary with no constant symbols and no function symbols. 
Suppose A is structure over Q and P E o is a unary predicate. The relativization AP of 
A to P is the substructure of A the universe of which is the interpretation of P in A. 
Definition 4.4. Let Q be a (finite or infinite) sequence of generalized quantifiers. We 
say that _Yk,,(Q) has the relativization property if for any vocabulary (r with no 
constant symbols and no function symbols, any unary predicate PEG and any 
CPEY~JQ) over o there is (POE&&,, so that for A over o 
Relativization property for _!ZzJQ) is defined similarly. 
Example 4.5. The logic Z&,(C) has the relativization property. This can be proved 
by induction on the complexity of formulas. The crucial step in the induction is the 
definition 
(3ixcp(x))’ = 3ix(P(x) A q(x)). 
Example 4.6. The logic Yk(QeV,J has the relativization property. The crucial step in 
the induction is 
(Qeven~(x))~ = Qeven W’W A dx)). 
Proposition 4.7. Suppose Q is a monotone simple unary quant@er. Then L?&,(Q) has 
the relativization property if and only if Q is eventually counting. 
Proof. First of all, if Q is eventually counting, it is easy to see that Z&,,(Q) has the 
relativization property. Let us then assume P’:,(Q) has the relativization property. If 
Q is not eventually counting, it is either unbounded or eventually bounded. Suppose 
first Q is unbounded. Let 0 be a vocabulary with two predicate symbols PI and Pz. 
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Choose m so that min(ra(m), m - rQ(m)) > k. Let n be a positive integer so that 
min(r&), n - m(n)) > m f k. Let A be a structure over cr with [a] as universe and 
with P< = (l,..., kj, P< = (I ,..., m). Respectively, let B be a structure over B with 
(l,..., ~3 as universe and with PT = {I, . . . t r&z)>, P$ = {l, . . . , m>. Now 
A ti (Qxl$ (x))(‘~) and B l= (QxPr (x))“~‘, 
so it remains to show that Player II wins the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
For this end, suppose we are in the middle of the game, and pebbles have been placed 
on elements ul, . . . , a, of A and bl, . . . , b, of B, where I < k. Suppose Player I plays 
now a subset X of, say A, with 1x1 2 r&). Let us assume, for simplicity, that 
Xn(q, . ..) a,} = {al, . ..) a,}. Since the predicate P2 has less than ra(n) - k elements, 
X contains an element c outside P2 u {ai, . . . , a,>. The strategy of Player II is to let his 
set Y consist of elements outside P2 plus the elements (b,, . . . , b,f. Since there are at 
least k l re(n) elements outside P2, Player II can make sure that 1 Y 1 >, r&z). Next 
Player I puts a pebble on an element y of Y. If y E fb, , . . . , b,}, Player II puts his pebble 
on the corresponding element of {al, . . . , a,>. If, on the other hand, y is outside P2, 
Player II puts his pebble on c. The case that X is a subset of B is entirely similar. This 
ends the description of the winning strategy of PIayer II. 
Suppose then Q is eventually bounded. Let N, Si = (r,, . . . , rl>, Sz = (q, . . . , s,) be 
as in the definition of eventual boundedness (Definition 2.4). 
Case 1: Both S1 and Sz are nonempty. Choose m, > 2k + sl so that rQ(ml) = 
ml - sl, and mz > 2k + rl so that ra(mz) = r,. Let n > ml -t m2 + k + s1 be such that 
rQ(n) = n - sl. Let A be a structure over G with [n] as universe and with Pf = [k], 
P: = [ml]. Respectively, let B be a structure over G with [n] as universe and with 
P: = [k + r,], P’: = Cm*]. Now 
A t ( QxPl (x))(‘~) and B k (QxP, (x))‘~~‘, 
so it remains to show that Player II wins the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
For this end, suppose we are in the middle of the game, and pebbles have been placed 
on elements ar, . . . , a, of A and bl, . . . , b, of B, where r c k. Suppose Player I plays 
now a subset X of, say A, with 1x1 B rp(n) = n - sl. Let us assume, for simplicity, that 
Xn{ar ).“) a,} = (al ,... , a,}. Since the predicate Pz has less than r&r) - k elements, 
X contains an element c outside P2 u {ul, . . . , a,>. The strategy of Player II is to let his 
set Y consist of elements outside Pz plus the elements (b,, . . . , b,). Since there are at 
least rl f k elements outside P2, Player II can make sure that 1 Y 1 > r*(n). Next 
Player I puts a pebble on an element yof Y. If y E {b,, . . . , b,}, Player II puts his pebble 
on the corresponding element of {al, . . . , a,}. If, on the other hand, y is outside P2, 
Player II puts his pebble on c. The case that X is a subset of B is entirely similar. This 
ends the description of the winning strategy of Player II. 
Case 2: Sr # 8 and S2 = 8. By assumption, Si has at least two elements rl and 
r2 > rI. Choose ml > k + rl + r, + 1 so that rQ(ml) = rl, and m2 > k + rI + r2 + 1 so 
that ro(mz) = r2. Let n > ml + m2 + k + 1 be such that ro(n) = rl. Let A be 
56 Ph.G. Kofaitis, 3.A. V&in&en /Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 74 (1995j 23-75 
a structure over o with [n] as universe and with P: = [rJ, P’: = [ml]. Respectively, 
let B be a structure over (T with [n] as universe and with P: = [I~ - 11, P!j = [Q]. 
Now 
A b (QXPI (x)y” and B $ (Qx& (x))(‘~), 
so it remains to show that Player II wins the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
For this end, suppose we are in the middle of the game, and pebbles have been placed 
on elements al,. . . , a, of A and bi, . . . , b, of B, where r < k. Suppose Player I plays 
now a subset X of, say A, with /Xf >, r&r) = r,. Let us assume, for simplicity, that 
Xn (aI, . . . , a,) = (al,. . . , a,>. Let x’ = X - {ai,. . . , a,). If X’ meets P$ - Pj, Player 
II lets his set Y consist of {b,, . . . , b,) plus rl - s elements from 
P: - (P$& . . . , b,}). This is possible, since this set has at least m2 - rl + 
1 - k > rl elements. If X’ meets [n] - P$, Player II lets his set Y consist of 
@ 1, ..., b,) plus rl - s elements from [n] - (P:n (bl, . . . , b,)). This is possible, since 
this set has at least n - mz - k > ml + 1 > rl elements. If x’ is contained in P: and 
X’ # 8, then 1x1 = rl + t, where t is the number of elements from {al, . . . , a,} which 
are outside Pt. In this case Player II lets Y consist of rl - s elements from Pf plus the 
elements (b, , . . . , b,]. Finally, if X’ = 8, Y is chosen to be fb,, .,. , b,). 
Next Player I put a pebble on an element y of Y. By going through the above 
different possibilities for the choice of Y, one can be convinced that a successful choice 
of x E X for Player II has been guaranteed in each case. This ends the description of 
the winning strategy of Player II. 
Case 3: S, = Q) and Sz # 0. This case is similar to Case 2, only slightly easier. 
Therefore we omit the details. 0 
Independently of us, Westerstahl [Sl] proved Proposition 4.7 for Z&Q). Flum 
[ 17, Theorem 4.11 has a characterization of relativizing monotone simple unary 
quantifiers on infinite structures. 
4.2. Universe-independent quantifiers 
In general, the truth of a sentence of the form Qxcp(x,a) in a model A depends on 
the cardinality of the domain of A. This is the case, for example, with Qhalf but not 
with QeYI'.. Let us call a quantifier ~~~uer~e-~nde~e~e~t (following [Sl]) if its defini- 
tion is independent of the cardinality of the domain of the model, that is, m E&(n) for 
some n 3 m if and only if m Ef&n) for all n >, m. The universe-independent quantifiers 
are a special case of relativizing quantifiers. Except in trivial cases, they are non- 
monotone. 
Corredor [13] investigates the following class of simple unary generalized quanti- 
fiers: If S is a set of natural numbers, we define 
cs = ((A,X): x c A, IXIES}. 
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These quantifiers are universe-independent and, indeed, every simple unary universe- 
independent quantifier is of this form. 
Corredor gives a characterization of universe-independent quantifiers definable in 
Z,(C,, , . . . 9 CsJ. We shall elaborate Corredor’s proof and get a characterization of 
universe-independent quantifiers definable in Z$,(Cs,, . . , CsJ on finite structures. 
If A is a set of natural numbers and n is a natural number, we let A 0 m = 
{i + ml SEA}. Note that CSom is definable in dpow(Cs). Let S N S’ if S A S’ is finite. 
Clearly, if S + S’, then Cs is definable in _5Z0,(Cs,). Lemma 4.8 and Proposition 4.9 are 
essentially contained in [13]. We give a proof for completeness. 
Lemma 4.8 (Corredor [13]). Suppose A and B are models of the empty vocabulary and 
both have cardinality > k. Suppose for all m < k: 
IAIES@m o lBlES@m. 
Then Player II wins the invariant (k, Cs)-pebble game on A and B. 
Proof. Let us assume, for simplicity, that all k pebbles have been played, but Player II 
has not lost yet. Suppose I picks a pebble and a subset X of one of the models, say A, 
so that 1x1~s. 
Case 1: X is a set of pebbled elements. Let Y be the set of corresponding pebbled 
elements in B. Certainly 1 Y 1 ES. Suppose now I puts a pebble on an element y of B not 
in Y. If y was not one of the already pebbled elements, II uses the fact that A has more 
than k - 1 elements to find a matching element. 
Case 2: X contains an unpebbled element. Now X is actually the complement of 
a set of, say m, pebbles, where m < k. Thus IA I E S @ m, whence IBI E S @ m. So the size 
of the complement Y of the corresponding set of pebbled elements in B is in S. Thus II 
can play this set and stay in the game. 0 
Proposition 4.9 (Corredor [ 131). Let S, S1, . . . , S, be sets of integers. Then the quanti- 
fier Cs is dejinable in $P&(Cs,, . . . , C’s”) ij” and only if there are numbers 
ml, . . . , Wlj,n,, . . . , nj and a Boolean combination S’ of the sets S,, @ ml, . . . , S, @ mj so 
that S - s’. 
Proof. Suppose Cs is definable in Z&,(Cs,, . . . , CsJ. It follows that some identity- 
sentence cp in _.5?kw(Cs,, . . . , CsJ is equivalent o Csx(x = x). Suppose also that S + S’ if 
S’ is a Boolean combination of the sets Si @ m, where m 6 k. It follows that there are 
numbers u > k and v 2 k such that u E S, v$ S but 
UESi@Wl 0 VESi@Wl 
for all iE{l,..., n} and m < k. To get a contradiction, let A be a structure of 
cardinality u for the empty vocabulary and B similarly a structure of cardinality v. 
Now A b cp, B \ 1 cp and II wins the (k, Cs,. . . . , C%)-game on A and B. 0 
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Proposition 4.9 gives a relatively simple method for deciding whether an universe- 
independent quantifier is definable from other universe-independent quantifiers using 
_Y&,. Of course, universe-independent quantifiers constitute a very special category of 
simple unary quantifiers. But it is interesting to note that in this category one obtains 
a complete picture of mutual definability relations. 
5. Finitely many versus infinitely many simple unary quantifiers 
In this section we consider finite models only. We have already observed in 
Proposition 2.7 that every unary quantifier can be defined in terms of the infinitely 
many counting quantifiers and _Y’z,. This raises the question: 
Is there a finite sequence Q of simple unary generalized quantifiers such that every 
simple unary quantifier is definable in Z&(Q)? 
A negative answer to this question can be obtained with a diagonal argument. Indeed, 
we show in Proposition 5.1 that for every finite sequence Q of simple unary quantifiers 
there is a property expressible in Z&(c), but not in Y&,,(Q). After this easy answer 
we pose a new question: 
Is there a property of finite structures that is expressible in -Y&(c), but not 
expressible in Y&,,(Q) for any finite sequence Q of simple unary quantifiers? 
The main results of this chapter show that this question can be answered affirmatively. 
More specifically, in Theorems 5.3 and 5.8 we show that there are natural polynomial- 
time properties that are expressible in _!Z&,Jc), but are not expressible in g&(Q) for 
any finite sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers. For this, we introduce first 
the (k, Q)-coloring method, which, intuitively, classifies ubsets of potential structures 
according to what the quantifiers Q can say about them. The proofs of the main results 
are then obtained by combining the invariant (k, Q)-pebble games, the (k, Q)-coloring 
method, and a Ramsey-theoretic model construction. 
SupposeQ=(Qr,..., Qm) is a sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers and 
k is a positive integer. The number k and the sequence Q impose a natural coloring 
&,Q on positive integers as follows: Let fi be the defining function of Qi. We put 
q,Ja) = ~~,~(b) if and only if the following conditions hold: 
(Cl) If a < k or 6 < k, then a = b. 
(C2) SE&(U) o s of;, whenever 1 < i < m and 0 < s < k. 
(C3) a - SEA(U) o b - sefi(b), whenever 1 < i < m and 0 < s < k. 
This mapping colors the set of positive integers with at most 4(k+1)m + k colors. 
Proposition 5.1. For anyjnite sequence Q = (Q1, . . . , Q,,,) of simple unary quantijiers on 
2F there is a simple unary quantijer Q which is not expressible in L?&‘,(Q). In particular, 
d;p$o(Q) # 2’&,(C). Moreover, if each Qi is PTIME, then so is Q. 
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Proof. It is easy to see, that if ~~,&a) = q&b) and a, b 2 k, then Player II wins the 
definable (k, Q)-pebble game on the structures ([a]) and ([b]) over the empty vocabu- 
lary. In particular, for such a and b we have ([a]) =-y:,(Q) ([b]). Let u. = 0. For k > 1, 
let uk be the least integer ark_ 1 such that there is a least rk > uk such that &.Q(&) = 
qk,Q(rk). We define a simple unary quantifier Q be letting f&ok) = {I&} for all k > 1, 
and f&n) = 8 otherwise. Now Q is not definable in X&,(Q), since for each k 2 1 we 
have ([ukl) +L;,(Q, ([ok]), but (c”kl) = y;,(Q) ([ok]). Suppose then each quantifier in 
Q is PTIME. We describe a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether a given 
model of size n is in Q or not. It suffices to decide whether n = ok for some k 6 n. This 
problem reduces to the problem of deciding whether two nonnegative integers 6n 
have the same &@-color or not for any given k < n. This problem is solved for integers 
> k by deciding the (k + 1)m questions “s~fi(a)?” and the (k + 1)m questions 
“U - s E j&r)?“, and comparing the 2(k + 1)m answers. 0 
Suppose again that Q = (Q 1, . . . , Q,,,) is a sequence of simple unary generalized 
quantifiers and k and n are positive integers. The numbers k and n and the sequence 
Q impose a coloring Xk,a on the elements of { 1, . . . , n} as follows: Let fi be the defining 
function of Qi. We put &@(a) = Xk,&b) if and only if the following conditions hold: 
(Dl) If a < k or b < k or a > n - k or b > n - k, then a = 6. 
(D2) a + s Efi(n) o b + s of;:, whenever 1 6 i 6 m and -k < s < k. 
(D3) n - a - sEfi(n) o n - b - sgfi(n), whenever 1 < i 6 m and -k <s < k. 
We call this coloring the (k, Q)-coloring of { 1, . . . , n>. As a first primitive application of 
the (k, Q)-coloring method, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.2. Given a number k 3 1 and ujnite sequence Q = (Q1, . . . , Q,,,) of simple 
unury generalized quuntijiers on 9, there is a counting quantifier that is not expressible 
in ok. 
Proof. Notice first that the (k, Q)-coloring partitions { 1, . . . , n} into at most 
4’2k- ljrn + 2k classes. Let n > 4’2k- lJrn + 2k. By the pigeon-hole principle there are 
two distinct elements a and b of { 1, . . . , n} with the same color with a < b. We show 
that the counting quantifier (3 ax) is not expressible in 9&(Q). For this end we define 
two models A and B of the vocabulary consisting of one unary predicate symbol 
P only. The universe of both models is [n]. Moreover, PA = [a] and PB = [b]. So the 
sentence 3 bxP(x) holds in A but not in B. It remains to show that Player II wins the 
(k, Q)-pebble game. This easy argument is left to the reader. 0 
In the sequel. we shall use more sophisticated combinatorial techniques to get 
elements that not only have the same color, but also satisfy some further properties 
useful in the definable (k, Q)-pebble game. Note that this method of constructing 
similar, but nonisomorphic, structures relies heavily on the finiteness of the sequence 
Q. For equivalence relative to infinitely many quantifiers completely different methods 
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have to be used, like those used by [9,25]. On the other hand, the models we construct 
could not possibly be equivalent relative to all counting quantifiers. 
The Hiirtig quantifier was defined earlier in Section 2.5. This quantifier is readily 
expressible in Z&,,(c), since the formula Ix,y(cp(x), $(y)) is equivalent to 
V,((3!nx)cp(x)r\(3!nx)cp(x)), where (3!ix)g is short for (3ix)OAl(3i+ 1x)8. We 
may conclude that although I itself is nonsimple, it can be expressed, as any numerical 
quantifier (Proposition 2.18) and any unary quantifier (Proposition 2.20), with an 
infinite set of simple unary quantifiers. We next establish an optimal lower bound for 
the expressibility of the Hartig quantifier. 
Theorem 5.3. Suppose Q is a finite sequence of simple unary generalized quant$ers on 
9=. Then the Hartig quantifier I is not expressible in LZ’gJQ). 
Proof. Let (T be the vocabulary consisting of three unary predicates PI, Pz and P3. We 
construct two structures A and B over c so that the following hold: 
l Player II wins the invariant (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
l A h:,u,B. 
We shall use the following well-known theorem. 
Van der Waerden’s Theorem. For all positive integers k and r there exists an integer 
W(k, r) such that ifthe set of integers { 1, . . . , W (k, r)} is partitioned into r classes, then 
at least one class contains a k-term arithmetic progression 
a, a + d, a + 2d, . . . , a + kd. 
(For a proof, see e.g. [20].) 
Let n = 2W(2,4’2k-1)m + 2k). We let the universe of both A and B be the set [n]. By 
applying van der Waerden’s Theorem to the (k, Q)-coloring Xk,+ we can choose 
positive integers a and d so that the numbers a, a + d, a + 2d are all of the same color. 
Let 
P: = [a + d], Pj=[a+d+1,2(a+d)], 
Pt = [2(a + d) + l,n], P? = Cal, 
P’: = [a + 1,2(a + d)], P: = [2(a + d) -I- l,n]. 
Wote that 1 PT\ = 1 P:], but I P: ( # 1 P$). So we only have to prove that II wins the 
definable (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B. Let us suppose r pebbles (r < k) have been 
played and it is I’s turn to move. Player I chooses a subset X of one of the models, with 
([n], X)E Qj. We use the fact that X is invariant under all automorphisms of the 
model which fix the pebbled elements. Let the pebbled elements of A be al, . . . , a, and 
let the corresponding elements of B be bI, . . . , b,. We assume as an induction hypothe- 
sis that the mapping ai H bi is a partial isomorphism from A to B. Let 
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A0 = {al,..., a,> and B0 = (bi, . . . . b,}. Let us assume X is a subset of the domain of 
A. The case that X is a subset of the domain of B is entirely similar. Let X’ = X - Ao. 
Case 1: X’ does not meet any of the sets Pf. In this case X G A0 and Player II 
chooses as his set Y the corresponding subset of BO. Since I Xl = 1 Y I, we have 
([n], Y )EQj. Next Pl ayer I can put a pebble on an element bi E Y and then Player II 
responds by putting a pebble on ai E X. On the other hand, Player II can choose to put 
a pebble on b $ Bo. So b 4 Y. Say, b E Pf. Since I Pf I 2 k, Player II can put a pebble on 
an element of IP:l - AO. 
Case 2: X’ meets exactly one of the sets Pt. 
Subcase 2.1: X’ meets P:. Using automorphisms, it can be seen that X = 
(Pi - AI)uA2, where {A1,A2} is a partition of &. Let {B,,B,) be the corresponding 
partition of B0 and Y = (P: - Bl)uBz. Since 1x1 = I Y 1, we have ([n], Y)EQj. It is 
clear how Player II continues from here. 
Subcase 2.2: X’ meets P;. Then X = (P: - A,) uA,, where {A,, AZ} is a partition of 
A,,. Let {B,, B,} be the corresponding partition of B0 and Y = (PT - B1)uB2. Now 
IXI=a+~-l~,l+lJ4I, IYI=~-I~,I+I~21. 
Since IAl = IBII, IhI = l&l and xk,&) = xk,Q(a + 4, we have (Cnl, Y)EQ~. 
Subcase 2.3: X’ meets Pi. Then X = (Pi - A,) u A2, where {A,, A2} is a partition 
of A,. Let {BlrB2} be the corresponding partition of B0 and Y = (P$! - B1)uB2. 
Now 
IXl=a+d--IA11+IA21and(Yl=a+2d-IB,I+IB,l. 
Since Xk, Q(a + d) = XL, Q(a + 24, We have ([n], Y ) E Qj. 
Case 3: X’ meets exactly two of the sets Pf. 
Subcase 3.1: X’ meets P’: and Pj. Then X = (([n] - P:) - A,) u A2, where 
{A,, A,} is a partition of A,,. Let {B,,B,} be the corresponding partition of B0 and 
Y = (([n] - P;) - B1)uB2. Now 
IXI=n-(a+d)-IA,I+1A21 and lYl=n-(a+2d)-IB,I+lB,I. 
Since Xk, Q(a) = xk, Q(a + d), we have ([n], Y ) E Qj. 
Subcase 3.2: X’ meets P; and Pi. Then X = (([n] - P<) - A1)uA2, where 
{A,, A,} is a partition of Ae. Let {B,, B,} be the corresponding partition of B. and 
Y = (([n-j -P:) - Bl)uB2. Now 
IXI=n-a-_lA,)+IA,( and IYI=n-(a+2d)-IB,I+IB,I. 
Since Xk, Q(a) = Xk, Q(a + 2d), we have ([n], Y ) E Qj. 
Subcase 3.3: X’meets P: and Pj. Then X = ((P:uP$) - A1)uA2, where {A1,A2} 
is a partition of Ae. Let {B,, B,} be the corresponding partition of B. and 
Y = ((P:uP!) - Bl)uB,. NOW 1x1 = 1 Y 1, SO we have ([n], Y)EQj. 
Case 4: X’ meets each Pf. In this case X is the complement of a subset of A0 and 
Player II chooses as his set Y the complement of the corresponding subset of Bo. Since 
1X1 = (Y 1, we have ([n], Y)EQj. 
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We have demonstrated how Player II continues to maintain Ui H bi as a partial 
isomorphism in each of the four cases. 0 
The theorem remains true if Hlrtig quantifier is replaced by the quantifier 
{(A,X, Y): X, Y c A,IAj = rn[Bj}, w h ere m is an arbitrary but fixed positive integer. 
For this and other similar extensions of the above theorem, see [46]. For another 
application of van der Waerden’s Theorem in generalized quantifiers, see [31]. 
Corollary 5.4. The queries “do twu &en vertices have the same degree?” and “does 
a given graph have two connected components of the same size?” are expressible in 
_!G&,(C’), but not in _Y&‘JQ), where Q is an arbitrary Jinite sequence of simple unary 
generalized quantifiers. 
Since no finite number of simple unary quantifiers can express the HLrtig quantifier, 
it is interesting to consider logics of the form 6pzw(Z, Q), where Q is a finite sequence of 
simple unary quantifiers. For every such sequence Q, the logic 9$,(Z, Q) constitutes 
a proper extension of 9&,(Q). In what follows, we delineate the expressive power of 
the logics %&(I, Q). 
In Section 2.5 we introduced the quantifier MORE and pointed out that it can 
readily define the H&g quantifier. In turn, MORE is easily expressible in U&(c) 
(this also follows from Proposition 2.18). Our next result provides an optimal lower 
bound for the expressibility of MORE and, at the same time, reveals that MORE is 
stronger than the HCrtig quantifier. The proof uses the method developed in proving 
Theorem 5.3. 
Theorem 5.5. Suppose Q is a jinite sequence of simple unary generalized quantijiers. 
Then the quantifier MORE is not expressible in Y&(1, Q). 
Proof. Let c be the vocabulary consisting of three unary predicates S, P2 and P3. We 
construct two structures A and B over 0 so that the following hold: 
l Player II wins the invariant (k, I, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
l A +L:,(MORE)B. 
Let n > 8(2k - 1)(4’2k- ‘jrn + 2k). By applying the pigeon-hole principle to the (k Q)- 
coloring &p, we can choose positive integers a and b of the same color so that 
a<b<n/2 and Ix-yl3k for all distinct x and yin the set {a,b,a+b,n-a, 
n-b,n-a-b}.LetP~=[a],PA,=[a+1,a+b],PA,=[a+b+1,n],P~=[b], 
P$ = [b + 1, a + b] and P: = [a + b + 1, n]. 
Since IPfI > I P:l, but IPj I c IPi I the sentence MOREx, y(PI(x), P2(y)) is true in 
B but false in A. So we only have to prove that II wins the invariant (k, I, Q)-pebble 
game on A and B. The part of the proof which corresponds to the (k Q)-pebble game is 
an easier version of the proof of Theorem 5.3. So we present only the new case which 
arises from the quantifier I. Let us suppose r pebbles (r < k) have been played and 
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Player I moves next. He chooses subsets X1 and X2 of one of the models, with 
1 X1 1 = 1 X2 I. We may assume X1 n X2 = 8 since among finite sets (X1 1 = I X2 I if and 
only if 1 Xi - X2 I = IX2 - X1 I. Again X1 and X2 are invariant under all automor- 
phisms of the model which fix the pebbled elements. Let the pebbled elements of A be 
al, . . . , a, and let the corresponding elements of B be 6i, . . . , b,. We assume as an 
induction hypothesis that the mapping ai I-+ bi is a partial isomorphism from A to B. 
Let A0 = (al, . . . . a,} and B0 = (b,, . . . , b,}. Let us assume the sets X1 and X2 are 
subsets of the domain of A. The case that X1 and X2 are subsets of the domain of B is 
entirely similar. Let Xi = Xi - &. We have for both X1 and X2 all the four cases 
presented in the proof of Theorem 5.3. This would seem to generate 16 cases 
altogether. However, because 1 X1 I = 1 X2 I and because of our choice of a and b, the 
sets Xi and X2 fall into the same case. In each case Player II chooses sets Y 1 and Y Z. 
In fact Player II has in each case only one choice for both Y 1 and Y2, Next Player I 
puts pebbles on elements cl, c2. We have to demonstrate how Player II puts his 
pebbles on elements dl,dz so that the partial isomorphism-condition of pebbled 
elements is preserved and additionally, di is in X1 or X2, according to whether ci is in 
Y1 or Y2. This, however, is entirely routine. 0 
Corollary 5.6. The queries “given two vertices a and b, is the degree of a smaller than the 
degree of b?” and “given two vertices a and b, is the connected component of a smaller 
than the connected component of b?” are expressible in P’&(C), but not in _!?‘,!&,(I, Q), 
where Q is an arbitrary finite sequence of simple unary generalized quantifiers. 
We shall now consider the query “E is an equivalence relation with an even number 
of equivalence classes”. We shall first show that this query is expressible in the 
extension of 9&, by MORE and another unary generalized quantifier. Let EM, the 
even multiple quantifier, be the quantifier of type (1, 1) that consists of all structures 
(A, X, Y ) such that X c A, Y E A, and IX I is an even multiple of I Y 1, i.e. 
Proposition 5.7. The query “E is an equivalence relation with an even number of 
equivalence classes” is expressible in _Y&,,(MORE, EM). 
Proof. Let 
cpl(x) - 1 IyMOREu, v(uEx, vEy), 
(P”+ 1(x) 0 Vy(MOREu, v(uEx,vEy) -+ Vx(x = y + (qI(x) v ... v q,(x))). 
Now q,(x) expresses the property of x that the size of its equivalence class is nth in the 
ascending order of all sizes of equivalence classes. Of course, there may be several 
classes of the same size. Let 
n(x) - EMU, v(Zy, v(yEu, VEX), VEX). 
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This formula says that there are an even number of equivalence classes of the same size 
as the equivalence class of x. Let 
?n” * ‘dx(rp”(4 + V(X)), 
r,” * -l ~G%(x) -+ V(X)), 
Finally, let 0 be the disjunction of all sentences 
where n runs through integers >O and the sequence dl, . . . , d, runs through all 
possible sequences with diE (0, l} and di = 1 for an even number of i. NOW 
0~ Yl&,,(MORE, EM) and 0 expresses the property of E that there are an even 
number of equivalence classes. IJ 
This upper bound in terms of two quantifiers of type (1,l) is quite tight. Indeed, we 
show next that no finite sequence of simple unary quantifiers can capture this query, 
even if the Hartig quantifier is also present. 
Theorem 5.8. Suppose Q is ajnite sequence of simple unary quantifiers. Then the query 
7s E an equivalence relation with an even number of equivalence classes?” is not 
expressible in LZ’&,(I, Q). 
Proof. The proof uses the (k Q)-coloring method. We shall make use of the following 
known result from Ramsey theory (see [ZO]). 
Theorem 5.9 (Folkman’s Theorem). For ail natural numbers k and c there exists 
a natural number F(k,c) so that if the set { 1, . . . , n> is c-colored, then there are distinct 
cl,. . . , ck so that all sums CiE-K Ci, where K G { 1, . . . , k), have the same color. 
Let a be the vocabulary consisting of one binary predicate symbol E. We construct 
two structures A and B on 0 so that the following hold: 
l In both models E is a equivalence relation on the domain of the model. 
l EA has an even number of equivalence classes. 
e EA has an odd number of equivalence classes. 
l Player II wins the invariant (k, I, Q)-pebble game on A and B. 
We may assume k is odd. Let n = 2F(2k24k, 4(2k-1)m -I- 2k). We let the universe of both 
A and B be the set [n]. By applying Folkman’s Theorem to the (k Q)-coloring xk, p, we 
can choose positive integers cl,. . . , ck so that the numbers CisR Ci, K c (1, . . . , k + 11, 
are all of the same xk,p- color. We may additionally require: 
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(4 I& - C,( 2 k and In - Ci - C, 1 2 k for sums x1 and & of two disjoint 
nonvoid sets of the numbers cl, . . . , ck. 
Let c0 = n - cl - ‘.. - ck. We let A have equivalence classes Aa, . . . , &, where Ai is of 
size ci. We let B have equivalence classes BO, B2, . . . , Bk, where B2 is of size cl -t c2 and 
Bi is of size ci for i # 2. Now A has an even number of equivalence classes and B an 
odd number. So we only have to prove that II wins the definable (k, I, Q)-pebble game 
on A and B. Let us suppose r pebbles (r < k) have been played and Player I is to move. 
Let the pebbled elements of A be al, . . . , a, (without repetitions) and let the corres- 
ponding elements of B be b, , . . . , b,. If Player I makes a move of the ordinary k-pebble 
game, the strategy of Player II is easy to describe. So we assume Player I makes 
a generalized quantifier move. 
Suppose Player I chooses a subset X of one of the models, with ([n], X)E Qj. We 
use the fact that X is invariant under all automorphisms of the model which fix the 
pebbled elements. Let us assume X is a subset of the domain of A. The case that X is 
a subset of the domain of B is entirely similar. Let for 0 < i < k. 
Ii = (j: aj E Ai) and Ji = fj: bj E Bi). 
We assume as an induction hypothesis that the mapping ai H bi is a partial isomor- 
phism from A to B, IO = Jo and I, = .Z2. 
Let 
So = {i < k: XnAi =Z {al: j~Zi} for some Zi c Ii}, 
St = (i d k: XfTAi = Ai - (uj: jeZi) for some ZI E Ii). 
Since X is closed under automorphisms which fix al, . . . , a,, we have that [0, k] is the 
disjoint union of the sets S, and Sr. Now we know X already: 
X=juj:je~lrju~,(Ai-{uj:j~Z:)), 
and we can calculate the cardinality of 1x1: 
IX/= C Ci+Sy where s = 1 IZ:l - 1 ]Z:I. 
id, idiD ieS, 
Note that IsI < k. Since ui H bi is a partial isomorphism, there is 
rr:(O,..., k) -(0,2,..., k) SO that for all i, Ii = Jni, and additionally, 
nl = 2. Let 
a mapping 
aO=O and 
where J:i = It. 
Case 1. OE&: Let Sb = (l}urc[&,], if lo&, and S& = n[So] otherwise, and 
S’, = {lf u x[S,], if 1 ES~, and S; = rr[SJ otherwise. NOW, 1 Y / = Cies; ci + s. Since 
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CieS, 
ci and xies; ci have the same color, ([n], Y)EQ~. The set Y is the move of 
Player II. 
Case 2. 0 ES,: In this case 
IXI=n- 1 Ci+S. 
icSe 
NOW, 1 Y 1 = n - Ciesbci + S. Since CieS, ci and CiEs;ci have the same color, 
([n], Y )EQ~. The set Y is the move of Player II. 
Next Player I puts a pebble on some element b of [n]. Now Player II puts his pebble 
on an element a of [n] in such a way that 
1. a = aj if and only if b = bj. 
2. aEAaj if and only if bEBbj. 
3. ae A, if and only if be&,. 
4. aEAl if and only if bEB2. 
5. aEXifandonlyifbEY. 
This choice guarantees that Player II can maintain his strategy and play the game 
without ever losing. It is clear that Player II can in fact find the required a. 
Next we have to describe the strategy of Player II in the case that Player I makes 
a Hartig-quantifier move, that is, chooses two subsets X1 and X, of, say, A. The 
assumption is that I X1 I = IX, I and both X1 and X, are definable from al, . . . , a,. By 
what was said in the proof of Theorem 5.5, we may assume X1 n X2 = 0. As above, we 
can calculate the cardinalities of the sets X1 and X,. For this, let 
Slo = {i < k: Xr f3Ai = {aj: jEI;i} for some Z;i E Ii}, 
Sii = {i < k: X1 nAi = Ai - {aj: jEZ;i} for some Z;i C Zi}, 
Sz, = {i < k: XznAi = (aj: jeZ;i} for some Z;i E Ii}, 
Szi = {i < k: X2 n Ai = Ai - {aj: jEZ;i} for some Z;i E Zi}. 
Here SrO, S1 1 and &,, Szl are partitions of [0, n]. We have the representations: 
X1 = {aj: jEiiO Z;ijUii, (Ai - {aj: jEZ;i}h 
X2 = aj: jE U Z;i U u (Ai - {aj: jEZ&}). 
is&, is&, 
Let 
h = C Iz;il -- 1 Iz;il, 
ieS,, icS,, 
sZ = C Izt?il - 1 Iz;il. 
is& is&, 
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One of the following cases occurs: 
1. 0$S1.1uS21, 1X1\ = Ciss,,ci + s1 and IX,1 = ‘&fs,,ci + ~2. Since XtnXZ =8 
and IX1 / = IX,/, assumption (*) implies Si 1 = Szl = 8. Therefore, X1 = (Uj: 
jEUifS,, l;j) and X2 = (Uj: jEIJies,,I;jf. 
2. OES’~~ - S21, 1x11 = n - Cies,,ci -t ~1 and 1x21 =CiEs,,Ci + ~2. By (*) and 
1 X1 1 = 1 X2 1, this is impossible. 
3. OE& - Srl, /X1/ = Ciss,,ci + s1 and 1x21 = u -Ciss,,Ci + Sz- By (*) and 
/X1 j = I XZ j, this is impossible. 
4. OES~~~S~~, 1X11 = n -Ciss,,ci + s1 and /X21 = n -Ciss,,ci + ~2. By f*) we 
have S1, = SZO = 8. This contradicts Xi nX2 = 8. 
Only case 1 is possible. Thus there is no difficulty for Player II to choose his sets Y 1 
and Y2 as the corresponding sets of pebbled elements and maintain his strategy. 
Remark. With a little extra work one can show the following: If Q is a finite sequence 
of simple unary quantifiers, then the query “is E an equivalence relation with an even 
number of equivalence classes?” is not expressible in yl&,(l, EM, Q). It is also possible 
to replace the query “is E an equivalence relation with an even number of equivalence 
classes?” by the more general query “is E an equivalence relation the number of 
equivalence classes of which is in A?“, where A is an arbitrary but fixed infinite and 
coinfinite set of positive integers. For these and similar extensions of the above 
theorem, see [46]. 
Corollary 5.10. The queries “is a given graph a union of an even number of maximal 
cliques?” and “does a given graph have an even number of connected components?” are 
expressible in 5?&,(C), but not in P’&,,(I, Q), where Q is an arbitrary$nite sequence of 
simple unary generalized quantijers. The query “is the chromatic number of a given 
graph on even number?~’ is not expressible in ZC&,,(I, Q), where Q is an urbitrary~nite 
sequence of simple unary quantifiers. 
Proof. Let A and B be the models constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.8. Let the 
graph G consist of the complement of the equivalence relation B, and the graph 
H similarly of the complement of B. Then the chromatic number of G is even but the 
chromatic number of H is odd. 0 
6. Abstract finite model theory 
In his paper [40] Per Lindstrom presented a general definition of an abstract 
extension of first-order logic. The study of such extensions was subsequently called 
abstract model theory. The idea was to have the various known extensions of 
first-order logic, such as infinitary languages and logics with generalized quantifiers, 
as instances of a single concept. Once the concept was there, it was meaningful to pose 
questions, like the following: Does first-order logic permit a simple characterization 
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among all abstract logics? Lindstrom answered this question affirmatively in a num- 
ber of interesting ways, and this really got the subject into a good start. 
The 1970s were a period of intense research activity on abstract model theory, but 
only the beginning of finite model theory. In its present form, abstract model theory 
does not cover finite model theory and, as a result, the fundamental notions of 
abstract model theory must be modified and reformulated if they are to apply to logics 
defined on finite models only. There is a strong motivation for undertaking a study of 
abstract finite model theory. Indeed, first-order logic on finite structures is so weak 
that the need of studying its extensions eems more urgent than on infinite structures. 
Our purpose in this section is to modify Lindstrom’s [40] definition of an abstract 
logic in such a way that it covers also logics based on restricted classes of structures. 
We shall then discuss, how this new concept may help us bring some order into the 
family of various logics on finite structures. 
We use, as much as possible, the notation of [S]. A oocabulury is a set of relation, 
function and constant symbols. A vocabulary may be also many-sorted. We use r, 
(T, ..* to denote vocabularies. We fix a binary predicate symbol < to denote the 
ordering of finite ordered structures. The following vocabularies will be frequently 
referred to: 
YS = {r 1 r is an arbitrary single-sorted vocabulary}, 
The universe of a many-sorted structure is defined as the union of the various 
universes of different sorts. We shall consider below subclasses of the class of all 
structures. This is where our definition of an abstract logic differs from the usual one. 
We allow the logic to be defined relative to a restricted class of structures, like the class 
of all finite structures, or the class of all ordered finite structures. Another new feature 
in our definition is that we declare already in the definition of a logic which variable 
symbols are allowed. This is because we want to include logics with a limited finite 
number of variables only. The variable symbols may be for elements of arbitrary sort 
or for a limited collection of sorts. We use V to denote a set of variable symbols. Let 
Assgn,,.- be the class of assig~~nts of variables of Y in A, i.e., the class of functions 
f with V as domain and elements of the universe of A of the appropriate sort as values. 
Definition 6.1. An abstract logic on X is a 5-tuple L = (2, F, X, V, bL), where 
(I) F is a set of vocabularies. 
(2) Y and X are mappings defined on vocabularies r E F such that _Y[r] is a class 
(the class of Y-$ormulas of vocabulary r) and X[r] is a class of r-structures. 
(3) Y” is a set of variable symbols. 
(4) !=L is a relation of elements of X [r], U[rJ and Assgn,, y, where r is an arbitrary 
vocabulary and A E J? [r]. If (A, cp, f) is in the relation FL, we write A FL 9 [f J. 
Moreover, the following properties (5)-(9) are required to hold: 
(5) If o G (T, then Z[r] E _Y[a]. 
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(6) IfAEX[r] andAk,cp[f], then ~E~‘[cz]. 
(7) Zsomorphism property. If A,B E X [r], cp E 22 [r], f~ Assgn,, 1 , A t=L rp [f] and 
n:A z B, then BI=Lcp[xf]. 
(8) Reduct property. If AEX[T’], cp E U[T], f~ Assgn,, Y , A bL cp[f] and r c T’, 
then Alz bLq[f]. 
(9) Renaming property. Suppose p : t -+ z’ is a bijection mapping sort symbols to 
sort symbols, predicate symbols to predicate symbols of the same arity, function 
symbols to function symbols of the same arity and constants to constants o that sorts 
that symbols of r are equipped with correspond via p to sorts the respective symbols 
are equipped with in t’. If A E X [z], then let APT X [z’] be the results of renaming 
objects of A according to p. Then for all cp E $P[r] there is (pP E _‘Z [r’] such that for all 
A E X [z] and all f~ Assgn,, I , 
The concept “A is a model of cp”, where A E X [z] and cp E 2 [z], is defined to mean 
VIE Assgn,. 1 -(A bL cp [f]), and denoted by A != cp. 
An abstract logic onjnite structures is an abstract logic on the class 9 of all finite 
structures. 
Example 6.2. First-order logic FO is (90, Fs-,, 9, V,, kFO), where P, is an infinite set 
of variable symbols, Fto [r] is the set of ordinary first-order z-formulas, and &, is the 
ordinary satisfaction predicate of first-order logic. This is the single-sorted version. 
First-order logic on jnite structures FO/F = (50, Ts,9, $$, I=& is obtained by 
substituting B for Y. First-order logic on ordered jnite structures is FO/9?I = 
(PC;, &, SC<, *y^, , bFO) is obtained by substituting & for Y. First-order logic with 
k variables onjnite structures is FOk/9 = (9&, Ys-,, 9, Y$, bFO), where % is a set of 
k variable symbols. The formulas of this logic are obtained from FO[T] by simply 
leaving out all formulas which contain variables which are not in Y$. 
Examples 6.3. Second-order logic SO is (Y2, Fs-,, Y, 92, km), where Fs and *y;, are as 
above, _P2 [r] is the set of ordinary second-order -formulas, and kso is the ordinary 
satisfaction predicate of second-order logic. Second-order logic differs from first-order 
logic in that it allows quantification over n-ary relations on the universe. Second-order 
logic on jinite structures is SO/F = (Zip’, Fs-,, 9, VW, I=& Second-order logic on or- 
dered jinire structures is SO/F< = ( Y2, Y’II, $?I, V,, &,). 
Example 6.4. C:-fragment of second-order logic is (Zi, Fs-,, P’, Vm), !=rl), where C: [T] is 
the set of existential second-order -formulas 
3R, . . . 3R,cp, 
w%,Czu{R,, . . . . J&)1, and krl is the natural restriction of kso. As above, we get 
a version for finite (C i/F;) and ordered finite structures (Z i/F..) by replacing Y by 
F or F<. 
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Example 6.5. Monadic Ei-fragment of second order logic is (C~,I,FS,Y,-tr,, bz;,,), 
where C :, 1 [z] is the set of monadic existential second-order -formulas 
3R I . . . 3R,rp, 
where RI, . . . , R, are monadic predicate symbols and cp E _5?_, [r u {RI, . . . , R,)], and 
kr; , is the natural restriction of kso. As above, we get a version for finite (C :, l/T) and 
ordered finite structures (C:,,/%_J by replacing Y by % for %<. 
Example 6.6. We have injinitary logic with k variables (T$&,,, , z:, 9, K,t=y~,) and its 
versions Z’k,/% for finite models and _Y?:,/%~ for ordered finite models. 
Example 6.7. For any collection Q = {Qi: iEZ} of generalized quantifier on 9, we 
have injinitary logic with k variables and with generalized quantijiers Q, namely 
L&(Q) = (_Y’iJQ), FS-,, Y, Vk, ku;,(Q)). There is a version L&,,(Q)/% for finite mod- 
els and a version Y:,(Q)/%< for ordered finite models. If Vk is replaced by VW, the 
logics _!Z&JQ), 9$,(Q)/% and Z’&(Q)/%< are obtained. 
Example 6.8. The logic of PTIME-properties. We let PTIME be the abstract logic 
(9, YS-,, %, Vm, km&, where S[r] is the set of PTIME properties of finite r-structures 
and,4 l=PT,ME cpif and only ifA has the property cp. The properties in %[r] are assumed 
to be closed under isomorphisms. The logic NP of NP-properties is defined similarly. 
By restricting to ordered finite models we get PTIME, and NP,. 
Example 6.9. Fixpoint logic is FP = (FP, Ys-,, 9, Va, bFP) and, as above, we have also 
FP/% and FP/%<. For any collection Q = {Qi: iE I} of monotone simple unary 
generalized quantifier, we have jxpoint logic with generalized quanttjiers Q: FP(Q) = 
(FP(Q), Ys-,, 9, Vm, kykmce,) together with FP(Q)/% and FP(Q)/%<. 
Example6.10. In his definition of fixpoint logic with counting Immerman uses the 
following type of a many-sorted structure [9]: let v denote a special sort reserved for 
a set of integers together with arithmetic operations on it. A counting vocabulary is 
a vocabulary which has no relations, functions or constants of sort v except the 
arithmetic ones. An intended structure for a counting vocabulary consists of a struc- 
ture A of cardinality n of some vocabulary r and a disjoint set { 1, . . . , n} as the universe 
of sort v together with basic arithmetic operations on these numbers. We denote such 
structures by (A, [n]) and call them counting structures. We use YC to denote the set of 
counting vocabularies. Immerman’s jxpoint logic with counting is 
FP, = (FP,,Yc,%, V&, km,), where FP, is the class of fixpoints of formulas of FO,. 
FO, is the extension of first-order logic by all counting quantifiers 3 ix. The semantics 
of 3 ix is defined as follows: If (A, [n]) is a counting structure and i is a term denoting 
an element of [n], then (A, [n]) t 3ixcp(x) if there are at least i elements a of A with 
(4 CnlL a b 44~). 
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One can also account for such diverse things as recursive model theory and logic 
programming, by considering the class of recursive structures and the class of 
Herbrand structures, respectively. In this paper, however, we will be focusing on 
abstract logics on the class 9 of all finite structures. 
An abstract logic in the sense of Lindstrijm [40] is an abstract logic as above on the 
class Y of all structures. In essence, our definition differs from Lindstrom’s in that the 
L-satisfaction relation is restricted to structures in X and all closure properties are 
relativized appropriately to X. 
Most of the above abstract logics satisfy all the usual closure properties of abstract 
logics. The only known failures are the following: C: is not closed under negation 
because the class of infinite models over the empty vocabulary is C :, but the class of 
finite models is not. Fagin [16] showed that C:,,/S is not closed under negation. 
Z :, JF is not closed under V, because reachability for undirected finite graphs is Z :. i 
(see [S]), but connectedness i not ([16]). It is not known whether C i/S, C i/S?<, NP 
and NP, are closed under negation or not. 
A few results of abstract model theory still hold for abstract logics on an arbitrary 
class X of structures. This is, for example, the case with the result that if the 
Craig Interpolation Theorem holds for an abstract logic L, then Beth’s Dejnability 
Theorem also holds for L. Let us recall this familiar result in our framework and 
notation. 
Definition 6.11. (1) An abstract logic (Y,F-, X, V”, kL) satisfies the Craig Znterpola- 
tion Theorem if for all ZE Y and Z’E Y and all sentences cp EL[T] and cp’~ L[r’], the 
following is true: if for every rur’-model A and every f; A 1, cp implies A t=f cp’, then 
there is 8 EL [z n 2’1 so that for every r u r’-model A and every f, A Is cp implies k bs 8 
and A kf 0 implies A b, cp’. 
(2) An abstract logic (9, .Y, X, “Y-, \J satisfies the Beth Dejinability Theorem if for 
all zu{R}EF and for all q~_Y[ru{R}], w h ere R is a relation symbol not in t, the 
following is true: if every r-model has exactly one expansion to a r u { R}-model of cp, 
then there is a @x)~L[r] so that 0(x) defines R in every model of cp. 
(3) An abstract logic (9,9-, X, Y”, l=J satisfies the Robinson Consistency Theorem 
if for all T E L[zln~J, T1 E L[tl] and T2 E L[zJ where. tl,r2eY and 
T c T1 n T2, the following is true: if T is complete (i.e. any two models of T satisfy the 
same sentences of L [zl nt2]), T1 has a model and T2 has a model, then T1 u T2 has 
a model. 
The standard proof shows that if L is closed under 1 and A and L satisfies the 
Craig Interpolation Theorem, then L satisfies the Beth Definability Theorem. It is also 
well-known that F0/9 satisfies neither the Craig Interpolation Theorem nor the 
Beth Definability Theorem [24,21-J. On infinite models the Robinson Consistency 
Theorem implies the Craig Interpolation Theorem [42, 1.31, but this is not true on 
finite models, as the following simple result shows. 
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Proposition 6.12. ZfL = (3, T-,X, “Y-, kL) is an abstract logic such that FO/5 < L, 
X c F and X is closed under reducts and expansions, then L satisjes the Robinson 
Consistency Theorem. 
Proof. Suppose T E L [zI nTz] is complete and T1 G L[TJ and Tz G L[zJ, where 
zl, z2 E r-, such that T E T1 n T2. Suppose furthermore that T1 has a model A1 and 
T2 has a model A 2. Let Bi be the reduct of Ai to the vocabulary z1 n z2, i = 1,2. Since 
T is complete, B1 and B2 satisfies the same sentences of FO[rl n ~~3. Hence B1 and B2 
are isomorphic. Let A be an expansion ofA, to a z1 u z2-structure such that the reduct 
of A to the vocabulary z2 is isomorphic with A2. Now A 1 T1 u T2. 0 
Corollary 6.13. FO/9 satisjes the Robinson consistency theorem. As a result, the 
Robinson consistency theorem does not imply the Craig interpolation theorem on Jinite 
structures. 
Thus, some of the basic results of traditional abstract model theory carry over to 
abstract logics on an arbitrary class X of structures, but not all. This is particularly 
true when we consider the class 9 of all finite structures. Therefore, it seems that the 
whole theory has to be redeveloped to cover, for example, the case of finite structures. 
The first important results in abstract model theory were the characterizations of 
first-order logic due to LindstrGm. LindstrGm characterized first-order logic as 
a maximal ogic which satisfies the compactness theorem and the downward Liiwen- 
heim-Skolem theorem. It is well-known that FO/9 does not satisfy the compactness 
theorem. Therefore this characterization is not valid on finite models. In another 
result, Lindstr& characterizes first-order logic as a maximal logic which satisfies 
both the downward and the upward LGwenheim-Skolem theorem. This also fails on 
finite models as FO/9 trivially fails to satisfy the upward Liiwenheim-Skolem 
theorem. 
Kolaitis and Vardi [35] characterized when a class X of finite structures is 
definable by a sentence of 2$,,. From this, we can obtain a Lindstriim-type result 
about the infinitary logic _5?&, on finite structures. We prove this result for logics of 
the form Y:,(Q). Before we can state this result, we need a new definition. 
Definition 6.14. Let L = (3, F, X, V, \J be an abstract logic and let Q be a sequence 
of monotone simple unary quantifiers. We say that L has the (k, Q)-Karp property if 
whenever A and B are structures in X such that Player II wins the (k, Q)-pebble game 
on A and B, then A and B satisfy the same sentences of L. 
Proposition 6.15. Let Q be a sequence of monotone simple unary quantijers and let k be 
a positive integer. The injinitary logic 9&,,(Q)/.F is the biggest abstract logic 
L = (3, F, X, f, C,) with X = 9 which has the (k, Q)-Karp property. 
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Proof. The abstract logic Y&JQ)/F itself satisfies the (k, Q)-Karp property by The- 
orems 3.4 and 3.9. Suppose then L = (Y, Y-, F, Y, bL) satisfies the (k, Q)-Karp prop- 
erty, and cp E Z’[cz]. By Theorem 3.9, a necessary and sufficient condition for a class 
X of finite models to be definable in U&,(Q) is that X satisfy the following condition: 
if A E X Player II wins the (k, Q)-pebble game on A and B, then B E X. If we let X be 
the class of finite r-models of cp, we get that X is definable in Y&(Q). Thus 
L < P’&,,(Q)lF 0 
The preceding result holds for sequences of monotone Lindstrom quantifiers as 
well, once Definition 6.14 is extended to this case. The proof is unaffected by this 
generalization. 
Proposition 6.15 is special to finite structures, since on the class Y of all structures 
the k-Karp property alone cannot characterize _!&, as a maximal logic. This can be 
seen as follows: Let WO be the Lindstrom quantifier {(A,R): R well-orders A). It is 
easy to see that _Yk,( WO) satisfies the k-Karp property on any structures. However, if 
infinite structures are allowed, WO is not definable in _FZ, and therefore $P&,(WO) is 
not a sublogic of 2&,,. We conclude by posing the following problem. 
Problem. Characterize$xpoint logic or partialjixpoint onjinite structures as a unique 
logic having certain model-theoretic properties. 
As mentioned in the introduction, fixpoint logic has emerged as an important 
extension of first-order logic on finite structures. Thus, a Lindstrbm-type characteriza- 
tion of fixpoint logic on 9 may provide us with new insights for this logic and explain 
its rich closure properties. 
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